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EU-lainsäädäntöön perustuvat ympäristömerkit ja miten niitä voidaan hyödyntää 
hankittavien tavaroiden määrittelyssä.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Scope and aims of the thesis 
 
The European Union is an economic and political union of 27 member states. Just as 
diverse as the individual member states of the Union are the different policy goals that 
the Union is trying to pursues.  It  is  inevitable that sometimes these different goals are 
contrary to each other and some might even by mutually excluding, at least on the face 
of it. The first and still primary objective of the Union, its ‘economic rationale’, is a 
functioning internal market between the member states.1 Protection of the environment 
has gradually increased its importance as a Union policy.2 What is beneficial to the 
economy might be detrimental to the environment. The primary goal of free movement 
of goods can be limited with various reasons, out of which environmental protection is 
one. In a broad scope, the topic of this thesis is situated under the capital of restrictions 
on the free movement of goods on environmental protection grounds. 
Public procurement amounts to about 18% of the combined GDP of the member states.3 
We can say that public authorities are one of the biggest purchasers of different types of 
products. Because of this, what the public authorities buy has many effects both on the 
market and for the environment as well. Since protection of the environment has 
become increasingly more important as a union policy the effects of public purchasing 
on the environment have risen to the stand. The Union wants to limit the environmental 
impact caused by public spending.4 ‘Green public procurement’ (GPP) is used to refer 
to the procurement of environmentally friendly products. The Union has identified GPP 
as a preferred tool to combat the environmental effects caused by public procurement.5 
The aims of a functioning internal market and a high level of environmental protection 
cannot be completely consolidated with each other. This contradiction between these 
two objectives of the Union is the underlying tension beneath the topic of my thesis. 
                                                             
1 Craig 2011, p. 581. 
2 Krämer 2007, p. 1-5. 
3 COM(2011) 896, p. 2. 
4 Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, Decision No 1600/2002/EC, article 3 (6). 
5 See COM(2008) 400 Public Procurement for a better environment. The Commission website on GPP 
offers a good outlook on the issue also, see http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/index_en.htm, sourced 
15.3.2012. 
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How to reconcile these contrary objectives and will either one of them take precedence 
over the other in a given situation? 
My main research question is in general i) what is the current legal status of GPP and ii) 
how should the law be interpreted regarding GPP, taking into consideration the 
integration principle and coherence of the legal system. In particular, I will look at how 
eco-labels can be used as tools for GPP. The method used is the systemic analysis of the 
relevant legal sources. These include primary and secondary union law as well as ECJ 
case-law.  
Article 3 TEU lists the main aims and objectives of the Union.6 The internal market and 
environmental  protection  are  both  present  in  it.  Article  3  (3)  TEU serves  as  a  starting  
point for my interpretation. Finding out how can these two policies be integrated 
together, or should either one of them be left as secondary or even withdrawing policy is 
an intriguing question per se, but it is also  important if goals such as the 2020 –strategy 
are actually to be reached.7 In  essence,  this  study  is  trying  to  find  out  how  well  the  
objectives of article 3 (3) TEU are transmitted into Union law by the application of the 
integration principle in article 11 TFEU. 
The outline of the thesis is as follows. The underlying tension between free movement 
of goods and environmental protection is dealt with as a preliminary issue. The relevant 
EU-law  and  WTO-law  on  the  subject  are  presented  in  the  next  two  parts  of  this  first  
chapter. They are supposed to clear way for the preceding arguments and to make sure 
that no boilerplate counterarguments are left unnoticed. The second chapter deals with 
directive 2004/18/EC on public procurement. Basic principles related to procurement 
are presented since they affect the interpretation law. The directives legal status towards 
GPP is then explored and finally a critical overview of a Commission proposal to amend 
the procurement directive is presented. Chapter three gives an outline of a selection of 
different  product  labels  issued  by  the  EU.  The  point  of  the  chapter  is  to  analyse  the  
                                                             
6 I understand objectives and policies in the way that Schumacher defines them: ‘the purpose of policies is 
the pursuit of objectives’, Schumacher 2001, p. 37. The general objectives of the Union stem from article 
3 TEU. The policies that are used to pursue these are then formulated in the secondary legislation, of 
which this study focuses on the public procurement directive and the eco-labelling regime. 
I have decided to talk about the Union’s labelling ‘regime’ in lack of a better word. In this context regime 
is to be understood according to the meaning attributed to it by the Oxford English Dictionary (online 
version, sourced 21.3.2012): ‘A method or system of rule, governance, or control; a system of 
organization; a way of doing things, esp. one having widespread influence or prevalence.’ For a student of 
law, and not social sciences, the word is devoid of any political or value judgment associations. I 
considered using the word ‘framework’ instead of regime, but since framework has an established 
meaning in EU law (framework law and framework decisions) it did not seem as a plausible alternative. 
7 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm, sourced 15.3.2012. 
3 
 
 
 
labels’ relevance for GPP. The fourth chapter examines the coherence of the legislation 
relating  to  GPP  and  eco-labels.  Various  types  of  arguments  are  deployed  with  the  
intension of trying to figure out what effect should the integration principle of article 11 
TFEU have concerning GPP and eco-labels. The fifth chapter contains discussion on my 
findings. 
 
1.2 Free movement of goods and restrictions on environmental grounds 
 
1.2.1 Treaty exceptions and mandatory requirements 
 
This chapter deals with environmental reasons as ‘mandatory requirements’ in the 
Cassis de Dijon sense of the word.8 This is the basis for the perennial tension that lies 
under the whole topic of this thesis; how can environmental reasons be used to limit the 
free movement of goods in EU-law? One aspect of public procurement rules is to assure 
the free movement of goods by allowing producers from different countries to submit 
tenders. Incorporating environmental aims to public procurement rules might be an 
obstacle to the free movement of goods. How does primary Union law react to this? An 
outline of the current state of law will be presented through the relevant cases and 
academic opinions on this matter. 
Article 3 TEU states that the Union shall establish an internal market. Article 26 TFEU 
clarifies that this means an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of 
goods is ensured in accordance with the Treaties. The actual rights and obligations are 
set in articles 34 to 36 TFEU. According to article 34 TFEU all restrictions on imports 
are prohibited. Article 35 TFEU prescribes the same for measures affecting exports. 
Article 36 TFEU lays down the rules on how restrictions to the free movement of goods 
can be set. The article lists a number of public interest grounds that are allowed as 
restrictions and also states that the restrictions cannot constitute arbitrary discrimination 
or disguised trade barriers. Protection of the environment is not mentioned in article 36 
TFEU. Out of the listed reasons ‘protection of health and life of humans, animals or 
                                                             
8 Case 120/78 Rewe Zentrale AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649 (Cassis 
de Dijon). 
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plants’ comes closest, but the ECJ has stated that it does not equate or encompass 
environmental protection.9  
What  does  this  all  mean?  Essentially,  that  the  free  movement  of  goods  from  one  
member state to another is ensured within the internal market, but that member states 
can take national measures to restrict  it  if  they have a valid legal reason for it.  From a 
legal perspective this seem to be enough clear and precise, but because the European 
Union is a union of supreme states policy and politics plays a role in everything that the 
Union does. 
The scope of article 34 TFEU was defined in Dassonville.10 It was established that 
along with pure quantitative restrictions on imports also other measures that have the 
‘equivalent effect’ (MEQRs) are prohibited under Union law. Simply put, a quantitative 
restriction would be to allow only a certain amount of products to be imported. An 
MEQR is trickier to define, but basically all measures which impede the importation of 
products from one member state to another, ‘in law, or in fact’ are MEQRs.11  
Cassis de Dijon further strengthened the free movement side by providing the ‘mutual 
recognition’ principle.12 The ECJ ruled that if a product has been lawfully produced and 
marketed in one member state then there is no valid reason why it should not be 
introduced into the markets of any other member state.13 This means that no double 
standards for products can exist. It is enough that a product complies with the legislation 
of  the  country  it  originated  from  or  into  which  it  was  first  imported  from  outside  the  
Union. 
Some academics have implied that because Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon purported 
the free movement of goods so strongly that the ECJ needed to reply with a ruling that 
would reinstate the balance between the free movement rights and the interests of the 
member states.14 This view presupposes that the member states want to preserve 
national protectionist measures rather than fully participate in the strengthening of the 
internal market. The way that the scope of article 36 TFEU is defined and how it is used 
by the ECJ affects the division of competence between the member states and the 
                                                             
9 C-2/90 Walloon Waste [1992] ECR I-04431 and C-203/96 Dusseldorp [1998] ECR I-04075. 
10 Case 8/74 Procureur du Roi v Dassonville [1974] ECR 837. 
11 Case 8/74 Dassonville, para 11. 
12 Chalmers 2010, p. 760. 
13 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, para 14. 
14 Chalmers 2010, p. 874; Dashwood 2011, p. 407; Snell 2002, p. 185. 
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Union.15 In this sense it is understandable that member states have an interest on the 
issue. Whatever the underlying reasons, Cassis de Dijon has also another crucial part 
that broadened the possibility for member states to restrict the free movement of goods. 
The ECJ first stated that the member states are free to legislate on all matters that the 
Union has not yet acted on (supposing that it is an area of shared competence under 
article 4 TFEU). The court then continued that national laws can set restrictions on the 
free movement of goods if they are justifiable under some ‘mandatory requirement’. 
The court gave examples of possible reasons: ‘the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, 
the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and the defence 
of the consumer’.16 This list has subsequently been complemented with various other 
reasons.17 Environmental protection was added to the list in Danish Bottles and 
reaffirmed in Wallon Waste.18 
This means that there are two possible ways of restricting the free movement of goods, 
either according to the exceptions in article 36 TFEU or by recourse to the ‘mandatory 
requirements’ doctrine based on Cassis de Dijon. These two instruments operate 
likewise but they apply to different situations.19  First, national measures restricting the 
free movement of goods are only justifiable in areas of law that the member states have 
competence to legislate on. If the Union has harmonized a certain area of law, then the 
member states are pre-empted from taking national measure in that field. In these 
situations restrictions to the free movement of goods are only possible according to 
what the harmonisation measure has enacted. In situations of minimum harmonisation, 
which is the mainstream Union policy currently, the member states can regulate on that 
area that is not covered by the Union measure. In this area that exceeds the minimum 
harmonisation measure member states have recourse to both the treaty based 
justifications and the mandatory requirements. So, the area where the member states can 
operate falls between the minimum level of the harmonisation measure and the 
maximums set by the principles of the Treaties. 
Secondly, the two instruments differ in relation to what sort of situations they are 
applicable to. Article 36 TFEU exceptions can be used to justify national measures that 
                                                             
15 On this issue see, Maduro 1997. 
16 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, para 8. 
17 Over twenty different reasons can be distinguished from the case-law, see Snell 2002 p. 192. 
18 Case 302/86 Commission v Kingdom of Denmark [1988] ECR 4607 (Danish Bottles); C-2/90 
Commission v Belgium [1992] ECR I-4431 (Wallon Waste). 
19 Snell 2002, p. 172. 
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treat national and foreign products differently. Put bluntly, they can discriminate against 
foreign products. 20 The mandatory requirements can only be used to justify measures 
that treat all products alike. This was established early on in Gilli and Andres.21 
So far we have established that environmental protection does not fall under article 36 
TFEU but that it is recognised by the ECJ as a mandatory requirement. These 
mandatory requirements can only be used to justify national measures that are non-
discriminatory. Thus the scope of using environmental reasons to justify restrictions on 
the free movement of goods is much more limited than the treaty based reasons listed in 
article 36 TFEU. 
 
1.2.2 Environmental protection as a justification 
 
Advocates general and academics alike have asked why are there two separate classes 
of justifications for restrictions on the free movement of goods.22 Classifying the 
measures into two separate classes that have different legal outcomes, based on what 
their aim or objective is, seems strange. Surely, it does not purport legal certainty and 
coherence  of  the  legal  system.  To  muddy  up  the  waters  even  more,  the  ECJ  has  in  a  
number of cases accepted discriminatory measures based on environmental protection 
even though under the original doctrine this is not possible.23 
Advocate General Jacobs has proposed that the ECJ should clarify the current state of 
law.24 In the PreussenElektra case he took the view that the ECJ’s earlier reasoning is 
flawed. He presented two arguments for why the distinction between article 36 TFEU 
based exceptions and the mandatory requirements should be eroded. Firstly, the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, signed in 1997, elevated environmental protection into the mainstream 
of  Union  policies.  The  integration  principle  of  article  11  TFEU  was  amended.  In  the  
light  of  that  principle  the  Treaties  should  be  interpreted  in  a  way  that  better  supports  
environmental goals. In practice this argument would mean to interpret the phrase 
‘protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants’ in article 36 TFEU to 
                                                             
20 Chalmers 2010, p. 877. 
21 Case 788/79 Herbert Gilli and Paul Andres [1980] ECR 2071, para 6. 
22 C-379/98 PreussenElektra AG v Schleswag AG [2001] ECR I-2099, para 225; Snell 2002, p. 218; 
Chalmers 2010, p. 878; Arnull 2006, p. 438; Craig 2011, p. 678. See especially Notaro 2000, p. 490, 
whose arguments for dismounting the distinction are very persuasive. 
23 For a list of cases see Dashwood 2011, p. 442. 
24 C-379/98 PreussenElektra, para 225-233. 
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encompass the protection of the environment also. Secondly, measures aimed at 
environmental protection are usually discriminatory because they are local responses to 
local problems. The established principle of union environmental law of rectifying 
environmental damage at its source also means that measures need to be taken were the 
problem is. This is the only way that environmental protection measures can be 
effective. 
Chalmers has stated that it is up to the ECJ to protect the divergent values existing 
within the Union and to deal with the challenges brought up by shifting policy 
opinions.25 Why then, has the ECJ not dealt with this problem unequivocally? Article 
TFEU 36 has remained unchanged since The Treaty of Rome in 1957 while Union 
policies and objectives have changed significantly. The functioning of the internal 
market is no longer the sole purpose of the Union.26 
In  a  few  cases  the  ECJ  has  accepted  protection  of  the  environment  to  be  used  as  a  
reason to justify discriminatory national measures.27 PreussenElektra is one of them, but 
even though the court accepted environmental protection as a justification it did not 
follow the opinion of AG Jacobs. The court did not expressly state whether it saw 
environmental protection as a treaty based exception (article 36 TFEU) or a mandatory 
requirement (Cassis) that was just allowed to be discriminatory. Dashwood prompts that 
it is the right decision from the ECJ to keep the two classes of justifications separate and 
distinct, but he does not back up his opinion with any arguments.28 Jans  on  the  other  
hand, is calling for the ECJ to give a clear ruling to end this dispute.29 He compares the 
situation of environmental protection to other mandatory reasons and concludes that for 
the other reasons this distinction is clearer. 
 The ECJ has in earlier cases declared that article 36 TFEU should be interpreted strictly 
and that the reasons listed are exhaustive.30 Without analysing the nature of precedents 
in ECJ jurisprudence, in light of these prior judgements it seems appropriate to argue 
that the court should not eradicate the differences between the two justifications. In 
addition, I think that there is a simple, yet logical explanation to the two separate 
justifications.  
                                                             
25 Chalmers 2010, p. 873. 
26 Rosas 2010, p. 180. 
27 See Notaro 2000, for an analysis of these cases and their implications on the ECJs stance on this issue. 
28 Dashwood 2011, p. 442. 
29 Jans 2008, p. 249. 
30 Case 46/76 Bauhuis v The Netherlands State [1977] ECR 0005 and Case 95/81 Commission v Italian 
Republic [1982] ECR 2187. 
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Article 36 TFEU derogations are part of the primary law of the Union, the Treaties. 
These can be amended only by a unanimous decision of the member states.31 The 
principles of non-discrimination and the free movement of goods are pivotal parts to the 
whole idea of the Union. A violation of both of these principles should only be made by 
the express decision of all the member states. The mandatory requirements innovated by 
the ECJ allow for it to play its part as the mediator between the national interests of the 
member states and the common goal of the internal market. The mandatory 
requirements are needed but it should not be up to the ECJ to decide to alter the division 
of competences between the member states and the Union.32 
Article  36  TFEU  can  also  been  seen  as  a  norm  that  defines  competence  between  the  
Union and the member states and effects the level of environmental protection that the 
member states can pursue. In an area of law that the Union has legislated on, but chose 
not to adopt a specific measure that protects the environment, the member states are not 
capable of doing anything since the union measure pre-empts national measures. In the 
area that is left to the member states to legislate only environmental protection measures 
that are non-discriminatory can be adopted (assumed that the measure is an obstacle to 
the free movement of goods). In this sense article 36 TFEU limits the possibilities that 
member states have when pursuing environmental protection goals. Because of this I 
have to agree with what AG Jacobs argued in PreussenElektra, that from the 
environmental protection point of view the current state of law is not as effective as it 
should be. But I maintain my opinion that it should be the member states that solve this 
issue and not the ECJ. On the same issue, Kingston has come to the conclusion that the 
ECJ is clearly unwilling to ‘attempt Treaty change by judicial means’, but has been 
forced to accept discriminatory environmental measures as mandatory reasons to give 
effect to the integration principle of article 11 TFEU.33 
  
                                                             
31 See article 48 TEU. The ordinary revision procedure requires that the changes are ratified in every 
member state according to their constitution and the simplified revision procedure requires a unanimous 
decision by the European Council. 
32 See Spaventa 2000, who analyses an alternative solution to the problem: considering mandatory 
requirements as internal to the definition of MEQRs. 
33 Kingston 2012, p. 138. 
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1.3 Free movement of goods and WTO law 
 
The European Union is a member of the World Trade Organization. All 27 member 
states of the Union are also members of the WTO in their own right. The different 
agreements concluded among the members of the WTO, which are generally referred to 
as ‘WTO law’, regulate public procurement and technical product standards. WTO law 
affects both the content and the extent that Union and member state legal measures can 
reach. European Union law has to conform to WTO law since the Union is a member of 
the organisation. Amendments to the public procurement directive have to comply with 
the relevant WTO agreements. In areas of law that the Union has only applied minimum 
harmonisation, or that fall under the exclusive competence of the member states, 
member states may take measures that go further than the union measures. These have 
to still comply with WTO law, since all member states are also individually affiliated to 
the WTO. In this sense WTO law draws a secondary outer limit to the legislative 
choices that member states of the EU can take.  
WTO  law  touches  on  both  of  the  specific  areas  of  this  study.  The  Agreement  on  
Government Procurement (GPA) contains articles on non-discrimination and technical 
specifications. These affect the possibilities to utilize GPP under the procurement 
directive. Both the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the General 
Agreement  on  Tarrifs  and  Trade  (GATT)  include  articles  that  affect  the  Union’s  eco-
labelling regime.  
 
1.3.1 Public procurement 
 
This first instruments on public procurement in WTO law date back to the 1970s. The 
current GPA was signed in 1994 and it entered into force two years later. Not all WTO 
members have acceded to the agreement, which makes it a plurilateral agreement.34 The 
question is, how does WTO law limit Union public procurement law and more 
specifically, would it allow requiring an eco-label from the products being procured? 
The  GPA  is  aimed  at  free  trade  on  the  public  supply  markets,  so  most  of  its  articles  
focus on ensuring this. The two elements deployed are actual rules banning 
                                                             
34 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_overview_e.htm, sourced 13.2.2012. 
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discrimination and procedural rules to facilitate this. Although the GPA also regulates 
on other matters, the non-discrimination clauses have been seen as the most important 
ones.35  
Article III regulates that the same treatment must be assured for foreign products as 
domestic ones, and that foreign companies shall not be discriminated. Article VI on 
technical  specifications  starts  by  stating  that  they  should  be  formulated  in  a  way  that  
does not set obstacles to trade and it then specifies that they should rather be defined in 
terms of performance than technical characteristics. The technical requirements should 
be based on international standards whenever possible. The GPA has no specific rules 
on environmental issues or eco-labels. The same content as in article III and VI is found 
in the public procurement directive also. 
The directive on public procurement implements the rules of the GPA into Union law, 
or rather, it complies with them.36 There have been no major disputes between Union 
law and WTO law on public procurement. No relevant case law exists on this matter.37 
This does not mean that conflicts will not arise in the future. As discussed later in this 
study, Union public procurement law is evolving and the impetus is a strong policy for 
environmental issues. This might entail possible conflicts with WTO law, although the 
different WTO agreements do contain environmental exception clauses. On the other 
hand, Matsushita argues that actually WTO law can well accommodate for 
environmental measures as trade restrictions.38 
As a conclusion, WTO law does affect the way that Union law on public procurement 
can be developed and it might limit the meaning that the current law can be given 
through interpretation. 
 
  
                                                             
35 Matsushita 2006, p. 746. 
36 Council decision 94/800/EC incorporated the GAP into Union law, along with the other treaties 
establishing the WTO after the Uruguay Round. The versions of the directives in force at that time 
already complied with the GPA. See, Review of National Implementing Legislation, European 
Community, World Trade Organization, GPA32, 12 January 2000. 
37 See Matshushita 2006b, ‘Major WTO dispute case concerning government procurement’. None of the 
discussed cases concern the EU. Up to date there are only four disputes concerning the GPA: DS163, 
DS95, DS88 and DS73 and no Appellate Body Reports. 
38 Matsushita 2006, p. 786. 
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1.3.2 Eco-labelling 
 
The TBT and the GATT both have articles concerning product rules and technical 
specifications. Their main aim is of course to abolish trade barriers. The way that these 
two agreements interrelate and are applied depends on the matter at hand. Since this 
falls  outside  the  topic  of  this  thesis  I  will  only  present  a  short  summary  of  academic  
opinions relevant for our case. As a general note, the TBT is a primary instrument. If the 
question is not covered by it then the problem is assessed under the GATT. The main 
question is does WTO law allow eco-labels? More specifically, are NPR PPM based 
labels allowed and are voluntary and mandatory labels treated alike by WTO law? 
A preliminary issue is production and process methods (PPMs).39 PPMs that affect the 
end characteristics of a product are allowed under WTO law. The issue on non-product 
related (NPR) PPMs is not that clear. Neither WTO member states nor academics agree 
on  are  NPR  PPMs  allowed  under  the  TBT  or  the  GATT.40 Vranes argues that 
systematic-teleological interpretation of the TBT and its negotiating history leads to the 
conclusion that NPR PPM measures might fall under the TBT agreement, and if so, that 
they are permissible according to it.41 According to Charmovitz, NPR PPMs can 
conflict with GATT articles I, III and XI but they can be justified with the exceptions 
listed in article XX, of which environmental protection is one. His view is based on an 
analysis of the relevant WTO case-law.42 On the same lines, Joshi argues that NPR PPM 
based voluntary labels are not covered by the TBT or the GATT and that they are not 
inconsistent with the WTO rules.43 
Labels that employ a life-cycle analysis are essentially NPR PPMs. Some of the labels 
studied in this thesis are voluntary and some mandatory. Vranes argues that at least 
voluntary labels based on NPR PPMs are allowed under WTO law.44 Matsushita goes 
further and argues that even mandatory labels applying NPR PPM requirements are 
                                                             
39 See chapter 2.2.3 where NPR PPMs are dealt with and explained in context. 
40 Matsushita 2006, p. 808; Vranes 2011, p. 3; Charnovitz 2002, p. 62; 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/labelling_e.htm, sourced 14.2.2012. 
41 Vranes 2011, p. 7. 
42 Charmovitz 2002, p. 101. 
43 Joshi 2004, p. 90. 
44 Vranes 2011, p. 9. 
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allowed, if they are non-discriminatory and comply with the most favoured nation 
clause and national treatment requirements.45 
The conclusion is that WTO law does not seem to set any restrictions on the further 
development of the EU eco-labelling regime. The principle of non-discrimination is one 
of the leading principles of Union law. As long as it is applied to also products coming 
from outside the internal market the labelling schemes seem to be legal. The only 
possible conflict is, if the Union decided to impose restrictions on goods coming from 
outside the single market. 
 
  
                                                             
45 Matsushita 2006, p. 818. 
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2. Public procurement in EU 
 
The Treaties have never contained any provision on public procurement, whereas for 
example competition law is regulated in the TFEU. Before secondary legislation on 
public procurement existed the only sources of EU-law affecting this field were the 
general  principles  of  law and  treaty  article  that  might  have  had  an  effect  on  interstate  
actions of companies. The current public procurement directives 2004/17/EC and 
2004/18/EC are part of a long continuation of evolving Union legislation. The EU took 
public procurement as part of its legislative agenda after it shifted from creating the 
internal market by eliminating tariff barriers to enhancing the functioning of the internal 
market by removing non-tariff barriers, such as public monopolies.46  The  first  
directives on public procurement were Directive 66/683 and Directive 70/32. They had 
as their objective to create an internal market for public supplies. The directives 
prohibited measures which either required to use domestic products in public 
procurement or effectively set restrictions for imported products to be used as public 
supplies.47 Protecting the suppliers’ rights, based on the four freedoms, was the core of 
the legislation.48 
 
2.1 Directive 2004/18/EC 
 
2.1.1 Legislative basis of the directive 
 
The legal basis’s for directive 2004/18/EC are articles 53 (1), 62 and 114 TFEU. Article 
114 can be considered as the primary basis, at least if looking at the stated aims and 
objectives of the directive, and the fact that it in essence also covers the specified areas 
of services listed in article 62. According to article 114 TFEU the Union may adopt 
measures for the approximation of national laws if it is necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market. This means that the objective of the directive is the creation or 
functioning of the internal market. 
                                                             
46 Bovis 1998, p. 222. 
47 Bovis 2007, p. 17. 
48 Kotsonis 2011, p. 56. 
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Based on the treaty system of competences the Union may adopt so called minimum 
harmonisation measures in areas of shared competence. A minimum harmonisation 
measure means that the Union only regulates a certain minimum rate of level playing 
field,  above  which  the  member  states  can  then  take  action.  Most  of  the  minimum  
harmonisation measures are based on the general minimum harmonisation clauses of 
policy specific articles of the TFEU, for example social policy (153), consumer 
protection (169) and protection of the environment (192). Article 114 can also be used 
for minimum harmonisation as a general clause.49  
Directive 2004/18/EC is a minimum harmonisation directive. One specific example of 
this is the so-called dynamic purchasing system. Article 33 of the directive leaves it up 
to each member state to decide whether or not they want to regulate on this matter. 
Recital 16 mentions this option on various different purchasing procedures. The actual 
procedures for the award of public contracts are listed exhaustively in article 28 of the 
directive.50 There are differences in the way that member states have implemented 
them.51 
According to recital three of directive 2004/18/EC the coordinating provisions laid 
down by the directive should comply as far as possible with the procedures and 
practices already in force in each of the member states. This is in line with the 
conception that out of the different possible legal acts that the Union can adopt 
according to Article 288 TFEU, directives are best suited for situations where there 
already exists convoluted national legislation on the matter.52 Directives allow for 
respect of national legislative and administrative measures. Harmonizing the existing 
legislation through directives can be more effective than re-regulating the whole matter 
with regulations. 
As with many other fields of law related to the functioning of the internal market, the 
Union has decided that directives are the most suitable form of legislation for assuring 
that public procurement is harnessed to promote it. Harmonizing existing laws and 
administrative practices was seen as a more efficient way than uniform regulation of the 
                                                             
49 Dougan 2000, p. 878. 
50 C-299/08 European Commission v French Republic [2009] ECR I-11587, para. 28. 
51 See for example the Finnish implementing law Laki julkisista hankinnoista (2007/348) article 27, 
which stipulates a “direct purchase” procedure (suorahankinta). The directive does not contain a 
corresponding procedure, instead the national measure is based on the negotiated procedure. 
52 Prechal 2005, p. 3. 
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whole field with regulations.53 This approach chosen for the public markets is the 
complete opposite than that of the private markets. EU competition law is based on 
regulations and full harmonisation.54 
 
2.1.2 The aims and objectives of the directive 
 
The main aim of the 2004 directives is an economical one. Simply put, to make the 
internal  market  function  more  effectively.  In  the  Commission  proposal  the  aims  were  
categorized as threefold: modernizing, simplifying and rendering more flexibility.55 The 
means to achieve this were codification, modernisation and simplification.56 What had 
previously been regulated in numerous directives was now codified into just two 
directives. New forms for the procurement procedure were introduced and the 
procedural rules governing the whole process were simplified. 
In  addition  to  this  economical  aim,  the  directive  also  aims  at  enabling  the  contracting  
authorities to take into consideration environmental and social needs in the procurement 
process. According to recital one of directive 2004/18/EC this is done by clarifying the 
possibilities of using contract award criteria to purport environmental or social goals 
that  stem from the  ‘needs  of  the  public  concerned’.  This  amendment  is  based  on  ECJ  
case-law, namely the Concordia case.57 Furthermore, according to recital five of the 
directive, it is also supposed to implement Union environmental policy into practice, as 
the integration principle in article 11 TFEU requires. 
Bovis has categorized three effects that a properly functioning market for public 
supplies would have.58 The trade effect would cut down prices and result in savings for 
the purchasing authorities. The competition effect would force national companies to 
compete with companies from other member states, thus aggravating the trade effect. 
These would lead to the restructuring effect, meaning the dynamic development of the 
companies offering goods and supplies to public authorities. This short categorisation 
points out why regulation of public procurement is essential for the proper functioning 
                                                             
53 Bovis 2007, p. 8. 
54 TFEU TITLE VII Chapter 1 Rules on competition and Council Regulation 1/2003/EC. 
55 COM(2002) 236 final, p. 210. 
56 Bovis 2007, s. 50. 
57 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy [2000] ECR I-7213. 
58 Bovis 1998, p. 229. 
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of the internal market in an economic sense. The regulation of public procurement also 
effects the free movement of goods and the rights of individual companies.   
The problem that this thesis focuses on is exemplified in the above mentioned aims. The 
recitals of the directive also point towards the integration principle in article 11 TFEU 
which is supposed to solve this problem. Chapter four focuses on this issue. 
 
2.1.3 Principles governing the award of public contracts 
 
One way to categorize the principles affecting the award of public contracts is according 
to the hierarchy of norms. In EU-law the Treaties are above all and thus the principles 
stemming from them are the most important ones.59 The general rule of interpretation in 
EU law according to the hierarchy of norms is that a norm must be interpreted to 
comply with the Treaties and general principles of law.60 Put differently, norms have to 
be interpreted so that they do not breach specific Treaty articles or the general rules of 
law, for example equal treatment and non-discrimination.  
Recital  two  of  the  directive  states  that  the  award  of  public  contracts  is  subject  to  the  
principles recognised in the Treaty. The components of the four fundamental freedoms 
are  mentioned  as  principles,  (for  example  ‘the  principle  of  free  movement  of  goods’)  
but the recital then continues to list actual legal principles that are to be given due 
consideration when applying the directive. Listed are the principle of equal treatment, 
the principle of non-discrimination, the principle of mutual recognition, the principle of 
proportionality and the principle of transparency. According to the recital these 
principles are derived from the four fundamental freedoms. Article 2, titled ‘Principles 
of awarding contracts’, states that contracting authorities shall act according to the 
principles of equality, non-discrimination and transparency. Recital 46 of the directive 
clarifies what these principles mean in practice. It also states, that by acting according to 
these principles effective competition is guaranteed. 
The general principles of law that are derived from the Treaties are hierarchically 
ranked at the same level with the Treaties themselves. According to Tridimas these 
                                                             
59 The ’general principles’ of EU law stem from either the Treaties or from the case-law of the ECJ. 
Hiearchially the Treaties are the highest source of law, second are the general principles and after that all 
other forms of legal acts. See Craig 2011, p. 108. 
60 Tridimas 2006, p.29. 
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principles are: fundamental rights, equality, proportionality and legal certainty.61 The 
principle of equality, prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality, is the most 
basic component of the four fundamental freedoms. 62 It is materialised in the individual 
Treaty provisions that comprise the four freedoms.  
The principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination can be seen as the opposite 
sides of the same coin. They are umbrella concepts that are not based on just one norm 
or precedent. According to article 18 TFEU discrimination based on nationality is 
prohibited. The same idea can be read from article 56 TFEU which states that 
restrictions on the freedom to provide services within the Union are prohibited, or 
article 34 TFEU which prohibits restrictions on the free movement of goods between 
member states. It is discrimination if products or services originating from one member 
state are not allowed into another. Products and services originating from different 
member states have to be treated equally. GPP based product requirements can be 
discriminatory if they can only be fulfilled by certain undertakings. An example would 
be to require that the products be made of wood grown in a specific place. This would 
discriminate against all producers coming from other regions. An acceptable 
requirement would be just to require that the wood is grown in a ‘sustainable’ way and 
then have this defined in a non-discriminatory manner. 
The principle of mutual recognition is based on the so called Cassis de Dijon case.63 
Regarding the free movement of goods, the principle of mutual recognition is best 
described as the country of origin principle. If a product is lawfully produced in one 
member state then it can be exported to all the other member states. The country of 
import cannot require the product to fill its own national requirements. It is enough that 
the product is produced according to the requirements of the country of origin. This 
principle is in line with the minimum harmonisation practice that the Union has adopted 
for matters relating to the functioning of the internal market.64 This principle affects the 
procurement processes as well, with the effect that if the products being purchased are 
defined according to their functional characteristics it is enough that they perform in 
that way and are produced according to the laws of their country of origin. A completely 
different issue is that if the technical specifications used to define the product are 
                                                             
61 Tridimas 2006, p. 51. 
62 Tridimas 2006, p. 60. 
63 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein [1979] ECR 649. 
64 Chalmers 2011, p. 696. 
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different than the normal standards of production used for that type of products in a 
different country. This is a problem of standardisation not mutual recognition. 
Proportionality in this context does not mean the same as it does when referred to as a 
general principle of EU-law applicable to judicial review.65 Proportionality in the 
procurement context can mean for example that the conditions defined for the products 
being purchased are proportionate to the content of the procurement process. It is not 
proportionate to require very strict technical dossiers from the producers if the 
purchased product is a simple bulk item. More specifically related to GPP, when the 
products are defined according to a specific standards and a tenderer’s product has not 
registered under that label, it is allowed to use other means to proof compliance to that 
standard.66 The  level  of  reliability  set  for  this  proof  has  to  be  proportionate  to  the  
products being purchased and the overall aims of the procurement process. Considering 
a fairly simple product, only the information given by the producer might suffice, 
whereas with a more complex product a test report from an independent testing 
laboratory might be a proportionate requirement. 
The Principle of transparency in the purchasing process serves two aims.67 
Transparency creates accountability and eliminates the possibility to discriminate a 
potential supplier on basis of nationality. It also enables the suppliers to determine what 
the purchaser actually needs and thus helping them to develop their products. 
Transparency is achieved by publishing the invitations to tender and the contract award 
notices. Transparency should ultimately lead to more companies participating and thus 
resulting in lower prices. 
Legal certainty is a basic component of our legal system. People subject to the law 
should be able to know their rights and obligations. This will enable them to plan their 
actions accordingly. This is especially true for companies since they aim for economic 
profits.  Because  the  aim of  the  procurement  directive  is  to  get  as  many companies  as  
possible to participate to the calls for tenders, procurement law should also be 
predictable. Companies will not participate into dealings if they are not aware of the 
                                                             
65 Chalmers 2011, p. 367. 
66 This situation is explained in more detail in the next chapter, 2.2. 
67 Bovis 2007, p. 63. 
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possible risks. In a modern legal system rules often need to be interpreted, but this does 
not mean that interpretation should be done on the expense of legal certainty.68 
Bovis also lists the principle of fairness.69 It  should  eliminate  arbitrariness  and  
discrimination in the procurement process. In practice, fairness is secured during the 
process when selecting the technical specifications that the products must comply with 
and deciding the factors according to which the tenders are evaluated. These decisions 
have to be based on legal, technical or economic factors. The articles of the directive 
that deal with these issues are directly effective in the vertical relationship between the 
contracting authority and the supplier. I think that what Bovis is talking about is just 
another expression of the principles of non-discrimination and equality. Fairness means 
taking care that no one is discriminated and that everybody is treated equally. Bovis’s 
idea of the principle of fairness is just a practical way to ensure non-discrimination and 
equality. 
In conclusions, the different principles affect the way that public procurement plays out 
and what is possible in the realm of public procurement. These principles are needed to 
settle disputes that controversial issues such as GPP and eco-labels might bring about. 
 
2.2 Environmental issues and public procurement 
 
Forty years has passed since the introduction of the first directives on public 
procurement. Yet, cross-border procurement amounts to only about 1,6% of the total 
amount of procurement contracts awarded annually.70  The amendments made in the 
current directives had as one of their goals to enable contracting authorities to meet 
environmental and social needs of the public concerned more effectively. The 
amendments are based on the case-law of the ECJ. The directives are also supposed to 
implement Union environmental policy into practice, as the integration principle in 
article 11 TFEU requires.71  If the aims of the original directives have been so poorly 
                                                             
68 Dashwood 2011, p. 328; See also Paunio 2011 for a complete presentation on the issue of assuring 
legal certainty when interpreting EU law. 
69 Bovis 2007, p. 63. 
70 COM(2010) 608 final/2, page 3 and also in COM(2011) 15 final, page 4. 
71 Directive 2004/18/EC recital (1) and (5). 
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met – an internal market for public supplies - what chances do the current directives 
have of effectively purporting the environmental goals that they are supposed to?72 
 
2.2.1 Public procurement and secondary policies 
 
The current standpoint is, and has always been, that the primary function of public 
procurement is to ensure a proper public market for goods with competition and cross-
border activity.73 Because of its volume public procurement is a strong policy tool.74 
What the state buys has a bigger impact on the producers than the actions of conscious 
private individuals. For this reason public procurement has often been used to advocate 
secondary policies. These secondary policies can range from local issues to protecting 
the environment and all the way to international politics.75  
The key legal issue concerning these secondary policies is do they have to be related to 
the subject-matter of the contract? This chapter analyses the position of environmental 
protection as such a secondary policy. The reasons for why a link has to exist between 
the secondary policies and the subject-matter of the contract are contested.76 
The first case that dealt with the legality of these secondary policies was Beentjes.77 The 
case concerned a public works contract in connection with a land consolidation 
operation. The purchasing authority had issued a contract performance clause that long-
term unemployed persons were to be hired by the contracting company. Beentjes’s 
tender was rejected, even though it was the cheapest one, because they were unable to 
fulfil the term of employing the unemployed. The ECJ concluded that such 
requirements are valid if ‘it has no direct or indirect discriminatory effect on tenderers 
from other Member States of the Community’.78 This rule has then been codified into 
                                                             
72 See Boyle 2011, on the same lines. She goes a step further and argues that the only purpose of Union 
procurement law is to facilitate inter-state tendering. Considering other goals for procurement should not 
be relevant before this has been achieved. 
73 Arrowsmith 2010, p 150; Arnould 2004, p. 187; Bovis 2005, p. 608. 
74 COM(2011) 896, p. 2. 
75 Arnould 2004, p. 187. 
76 Arrowsmith has argued that a more suitable term would be ‘horizontal policies’. She thinks that the 
term ‘secondary policies’ implies that they are somehow ‘illegitimate or subservient to commercial 
aspects’. I agree with her argument but because of the general scheme of my thesis and the underlying 
problem, calling environment a secondary policy seems more plausible. It makes the starting point of my 
argumentation more visible. See Arrowsmith 2010, p. 150. 
77 Case 31/87 Gebroeders Beentjes BV v State of the Netherlands [1988] ECR 4635. 
78 Ibid., para 37. 
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law. The only condition that article 26 of the current public procurement directive 
submits on them is that  they have to comply with community law, which refers to the 
comment  of  the  ECJ  in  the  previous  citation.  The  article  also  mentions  that  they  can  
particularly concern social or environmental considerations. Recital 33 lists examples of 
different possible contract performance conditions: vocational training, different goals 
associated with employment and protection of the environment. 
The contract performance clauses do not have to have a link to the subject-matter of the 
contract. Neither case-law nor legislation requires this. Arnould thinks that this is self-
evident, since the whole point of contract performance clauses is to pursue secondary 
aims. He also notes that by their very nature they are restrictive. This restriction on the 
four freedoms is to be balanced vis-à-vis the objectives pursued by the conditions 
through the proportionality principle. The fact that is the measure discriminatory needs 
to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.79 
Environmental secondary policies were first considered in Concordia.80 The purchasing 
authority used nitrogen oxide emissions and noise levels as award criteria in a public 
service contract on bus transport. The appellant claimed that only criteria which had 
direct economic value for the purchasing authority could be included under the 
economically most advantageous tender –criteria. After analysing the relevant article of 
the directive (in force back then) and the integration principle of article 11 TFEU, the 
ECJ interpreted the directive to allow the use of environmental award criteria, even 
though they were not mentioned in the list of possible criteria in the directive. The court 
then specified that the environmental award criteria, like all award criteria, have to be 
linked to the subject-matter of the contract. Furthermore, it listed terms that the criteria 
have to fulfil. The key ones being, that they have to comply with the principles of the 
Treaties and in particular with the principle of non-discrimination.81  
Environmental secondary policies were again considered in Wienstrom.82 Essentially, 
the ECJ was asked, in a public supply contract on electricity, is it legal to require the 
electricity to be produced from renewable energy sources? The ECJ based its answer on 
the Concordia case and the criteria defined there. It came to the conclusion that 
requiring renewable energy is allowed if the requirements set in Concordia are met. It 
                                                             
79 Arnould 2004, p. 192. 
80 C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland Oy Ab v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] I-
072123. 
81 Ibid., para 57-64. 
82 Case C-448/01 EVN AG and Wienstrom GmbH v Republic of Austria [2003] I-14527. 
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reiterated that a link to the subject-matter of the contract has to exist.83 In this case the 
link was obvious since the object of procurement was electricity. Wienstrom is not only 
an important case as a precedent on GPP but also because of the consequences it had to 
the Commission interpretation on the law. This side will be discussed in chapter 2.2.3. 
The conclusions from these cases are striking. Secondary policies can be pursued 
through public procurement. Protection of the environment has been recognised as a 
plausible secondary policy. Contract performance conditions do not have to bare a link 
to the subject-matter of the contract, whereas award criteria have to. Environmental 
policies can be driven through both instruments. Both situations are ultimately limited 
by the principles of the Treaties and especially the principle of non-discrimination. Why 
is it possible to pursue environmental goals that are not linked to the subject-matter of 
the contract through contract performance clauses, while the same is not possible 
through award criteria or technical specifications? What is the reason for this 
difference? If there is none, then the difference should be removed by flexing the 
possibility to use environmental criteria that are not linked to the subject-matter of the 
contract. A possible reason is that contract performance conditions, even though not 
related to the subject matter, are non-discriminatory by their nature.  
 
2.2.2 Possibilities to utilise GPP 
 
Kunzlik has plotted out different stages of the procurement procedure in which the 
contracting authorities can utilise green public procurement. His list comprises of five 
stages.84 When making the initial decision, that the authority has a need to procure 
something, it can at the same time decide that it wants to incorporate environmental 
aims to the process. This decision is governed by national policies and budgetary 
constraints. Next the authority needs to formulate the contract performance conditions. 
These can be clauses which state that, for example, the work has to be done in a specific 
way that is least detrimental to the environment. These conditions have to be set 
according to recital 33 and article 26 of the procurement directive. 
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 The third step is the most important one from the view point of this study. What exactly 
is to be purchased and how are the technical specifications of the product defined. This 
means how the product functions, how is it made and from what materials. Externalities 
relating to the production, use and disposing stages of the product can also be 
considered. The legal requirements and limits for technical specifications are listed in 
recital 29. I will address this topic more closely in chapter 2.2.3. 
The  next  step  is  the  selection  or  exclusion  of  suppliers.  According  to  article  50,  
suppliers can be expected to fulfil certain environmental standards in their business. 
This can mean for example that they are registered under the EMAS-scheme.85 A 
company that is not registered might then be excluded from the competition. According 
to recital 43 of the directive, non-compliance with environmental legislation, which has 
been subject to final judgement, can also be a reason for exclusion.  
The last step is framing the contract award criteria. In order for a contracting authority 
to use GPP the contract has to be concluded on the basis of ‘the most economically 
advantageous’ offer. In practice, this means that the authority must define how much 
relevance is given to the environmental aspects defined in step three. 
Beentjes concerned the second stage while Concordia and Wienstrom the fifth. The 
third and fifth stages (technical specifications and award criteria) offer the best 
possibilities to affect the environmental impacts that the products will ultimately cause. 
The following chapter focuses on the third step of defining the products. Links to the 
other stages are discussed if they provide interesting points of comparison or 
possibilities for analogy in interpretation or development of the law. 
 
2.2.3 Technical specifications and NPR PPMs 
 
The products to be purchased have to be defined in some way. According to article 23 
of directive 2004/18/EC there are two options for this. The first is to define the technical 
specifications of the product, for example what shape, size or form the product is. The 
product can also be defined by its performance or function, what the product actually 
does in practice. 
                                                             
85 The European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme, based on Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009. 
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Recital 29 and article 23 govern what sort of technical specifications may be used. They 
both start of by stating that technical specifications should not create obstacles to trade 
and should allow for all interested parties to participate. This is because the main aim of 
the directive is to create an internal market for public supplies and wrongly formulated 
technical specifications can, on purpose or by accident, repel possible tenderers. 
Technical specifications are an easy way to favour certain suppliers, based on location 
or an already existing product. 
Kunzlik has categorized the environmental impact that a product has in the following 
way.86 A distinction can be made between the production and consumption stages of the 
products life cycle. Two different criteria can be analysed in these two stages. The first 
are the actual environmental effects caused during the products life cycle. The second 
are the externalities, the detrimental environmental effect of the production or use of the 
product. Either the producer or the purchaser needs to internalize these into his costs. 
The life cycle of a chair made out of wood will suffice as an example to elucidate this 
categorisation. The production stage starts of by growing the wood. Wood can be grown 
in a sustainable way or harvested from endangered rainforests. The factory which makes 
the actual chair can be energy efficient or waste a lot of resources. The different stages 
of transportation can be of varying lengths and produce different amounts of emissions. 
If the chair is of good quality it will last for a long time and a replacing product does not 
need to be produced. When the chair comes to the end of its life cycle it can be recycled 
and the material used again, it can be burned and turned into energy, or in the worst case 
just thrown away to produce more waste. A more complex product, say a computer, 
uses energy during its operation. This causes emissions and also costs for the purchasing 
authority. These too have to be taken into account when considering how 
environmentally friendly a product is during its life cycle. Different ways to internalize 
externalities are for example environmental taxes effecting the purchase price and 
special fees that have to be paid when disposing of a product. 
The question of how and from what the product is made is of pinnacle importance when 
evaluating its total environmental burden. For public procurement to have an effective 
way of affecting environmental impacts caused by the purchased products, it needs to be 
able to impact the whole life cycle of the product. The so called ‘production processes 
and methods’ (PPMs) are paramount. 
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There  are  two  types  of  PPMs.  Ones  that  have  a  visible  result  to  the  end  product  and  
others that do not. Whether a product is made out of plastic or wood is a visible effect. 
Whether the wood is sustainably grown or not, does not have a visible effect to the end 
product. The PPMs can also affect the way in which the product functions or what 
performance characteristics it has. PPMs that do not affect the end product in any 
visible way are called non-product related (in short NPR). 
It can be clearly seen, that visible and invisible PPMs can both have effects on the 
environmental footprint of a product. Because of this NPR PPMs are a key issue when 
trying to purchase as environmentally friendly products as possible. The directive, the 
ECJ and the Commission all seem to have a different stance on the legality of technical 
specifications relating to NPR PPMs.  
Both  recital  29  and  article  1  (a)  of  Annex  VI  of  the  directive  state  that  technical  
specifications can include production processes and methods.87 The  directive  does  not  
say  anything  on  the  relevance  of  the  PPM  requirements  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  
contract. All it does is say that the specifications cannot be discriminatory and that they 
must ensure free competition. This seems to imply that NPR PPMs are allowed, since 
they are not directly forbidden, especially considering that it is a minimum 
harmonisation directive and it is also supposed to purport environmental goals.88 
The ECJ has not directly considered the issue of NPR PPMs but the two leading cases 
on green public procurement offer some insight to what their stance towards them might 
be. Both Concordia and Wienstrom dealt with award criteria, which is a different thing 
than technical specifications. In both cases it was stressed that the award criteria must 
be linked to the subject-matter of the contract. Is this to be interpreted that the technical 
specifications are also to be linked to the subject-matter of the contract and that NPR 
PPMs are not allowed? Kunzlik argues that since the ECJ has accepted the requirement 
of renewable energy as a contract award criteria it would be awkward not to accept a 
                                                             
87 Recital 29 of the directive states that ‘….. Contracting authorities that wish to define environmental 
requirements for the technical specifications of a given contract may lay down the environmental 
characteristics, such as a given production method, and/or specific environmental effects of product 
groups or services.’ (Italics added). Annex VI of the directive on the definition of technical specifications 
states in article 1 (a) that ‘These characteristics shall include … and production processes and methods.’  
88 See also Hilson 2008, p. 200. He thinks that the directive is ambiguous on this issue, mainly based on 
the differences between recital 29 and article 23 (8), although he does not further analyse the directive or 
give any other arguments for his view. 
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similar requirement as a technical specification since they have the same effect in the 
end.89 
The Commission has released two handbooks on GPP which give guidance in practical 
matters. These are not official legal statements from the Commission, but they do 
include legal opinions. In the first handbook, released in 2004, the Commission has the 
opinion that PPM requirements should be related to the subject-matter of the contract, 
and that they have to somehow contribute to its end characteristics.90 The Commission 
adds that this contribution can be ‘invisible’ and uses as an example electricity made 
from renewable sources. This is because requiring electricity made from renewable 
sources was ruled by the ECJ to be legal in its Wientsrom judgement a year earlier. 
Apparently for some reason, the Commission wanted to hold on to the opinion that the 
PPM requirements have to somehow relate to the end product, but at the same time they 
had to accommodate to the Wienstrom ruling so they came up with this ‘invisible’ 
characteristic of a product.91 According to the Commission, electricity made from 
renewable sources is different than electricity made from non-renewable sources even 
though this difference is not visible in the end product. The newer handbook published 
in 2011 is on the same stance.92 In addition, it states that the PPM requirements must 
contribute to the environmental objectives pursued, they have to be non-discriminatory 
and the principle of proportionality has to be observed.  
Non-discrimination in this case means that the required PPM has to be generally 
available to all producers. Requiring that a food product is made in a certain area is not 
permissible, but requiring that it is made according to organic standards is. The PPM 
requirement has to be proportionate vis-à-vis the environmental objective pursued. An 
adequate tool for defining this is doing a life-cycle assessment (LCA) of the products 
environmental impacts. According to the Commission the most cost-effective and 
easiest way of doing this is to define the technical specifications based on an existing 
eco-label because they already employ an LCA-analysis in their admission criteria. 
                                                             
89 Kunzlik 2005, p. 137. 
90 Buying green! A handbook on environmental public procurement (European Communities, 2004), p. 
23. 
91 Kunzlik 2005, p. 134. 
92 Buying green! A handbook on green public procurement 2nd Edition (European Commission, 2011), p. 
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Kunzlik  takes  a  more  permissible  view  than  the  Commission  and  presents  various  
arguments to back it up.93 He thinks that NPR PPMs should be allowed and presents six 
arguments in favour of this. Firstly, because of the integration principle of article 11 
TFEU the definition of ‘environmental performance’, in Annex VI of directive 
2004/18/EC should be understood broadly, so that it would include the whole lifecycle, 
and thus NPR PPMs, of a product. Secondly, the Commissions interpretation of 
‘invisible’ effects should be abandoned, because it is not based on a coherent formation 
of law, but on an ad hoc situation of adapting a desired policy to an ECJ ruling. Thirdly, 
the wording in Annex VI of the directive is open and does not restrict the use of NPR 
PPMs, so why should it be interpreted to do so? Fourth, the wording of recital 29 seems 
to allow PPMs without any reference to them being related to the end characteristics of 
the product. The ECJ case-law, that the directive is based on, has the same view. Fifth, 
environmental characteristics are presented as an independent award criterion in article 
53 without any reference or relation to functional characteristics. And finally, there is 
ambiguity between how the technical specifications are defined in different parts of the 
directive. 
A conclusion from Kunzlik’s arguments is that NPR PPMs should be allowed, if they 
are sufficiently clearly defined and if they are not discriminatory. As the examples in 
the beginning of this chapter point out,  NPR PPM requirements are the most effective 
way of taking environmental issues into consideration in public procurement. Using 
eco-labels is the most cost-effective and also uniform way for the purchasing authorities 
to utilise GPP. Combining the use of eco-labels and NPR PPM’s would thus be the best 
way to put article 11 TFEU into practice in public procurement. A conclusion with the 
opposite  effect  would  be  to  categorize  eco-labels  as  NPR  PPMs  and  retaining  the  
Commission restrictive view on them. 
AG Jacobs’ second argument is especially true in the case of GPP and eco-labels.94 If 
environmental protection measures were allowed to be discriminatory the use of life 
cycle costing and NPR PPMs would not be limited in any way. The down side of this 
would be, that it would also enable setting requirements that would seem to be aimed at 
environmental protection, but they would constitute de facto arbitrary discrimination. 
For example, it can always be argued that locally produced wood is environmentally 
                                                             
93 Kunzlik 2005, p. 136. 
94 C-379/98 PreussenElektra, para 225-233, see chapter 1.2.3 of this thesis.  
28 
 
 
 
superior than wood from some third world country, but is this actually true in every case 
is another question. 
 
2.2.4 Eco-labels under directive 2004/18/EC 
 
Eco-labels can be used in two stages of the procurement process, either when defining 
the technical specifications or the award criteria. Technical specifications are the 
minimum requirements that a product has to comply with while award criteria are used 
to define which of the complying products is best. 
According to recital 29 and article 23 (6) of the directive contracting authorities can 
define the technical specifications with reference to specifications in eco-labels. In 
practice this means that the requirements for the award of an eco-label are copy-pasted 
to the section for technical specifications in the contract award notice. Along with the 
specifications based on the label the notice must also include the phrase ‘or equivalent’. 
This means that products that have the actual label automatically fulfil the set criteria 
while products not bearing the label can use other means to proof their compliance. This 
can be done for example by presenting a technical dossier from the manufacturer or a 
test report from a recognised body. 
Article  23  (6)  gives  four  conditions  which  the  eco-label  has  to  fulfil  so  that  it  can  be  
used to define the technical specifications: i) the specifications are appropriate to define 
the product, ii) the label is based on scientific information, iii) all stakeholders can 
participate in drafting the criteria for the labels and iv) the label is accessible to 
everybody.95 
Eco-labels  can  also  be  used  to  define  the  award  criteria.  The  directive  itself  does  not  
mention this option but the Commission guidance does.96 This is done by dividing the 
different requirements of the label into individual award criteria. The products will then 
be given points from each of the criteria that  they meet.  A single label can be used at  
both stages. Some of its requirements are used to define the minimum requirements as 
technical specifications and the rest then to award extra points as award criteria. The 
                                                             
95 These requirements can of course be circumvented by just not mentioning in the notice that the 
specifications are based on any label! 
96 Buying green! A handbook on green public procurement 2nd Edition (European Commission, 2011), p. 
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Commission  assumes  that  the  same  requirements  apply  at  this  stage;  the  label  has  to  
comply  with  the  four  criteria  in  article  23  (6)  in  order  for  it  to  be  used  to  define  the  
award criteria and that other means of proof can be used by producers who do not have 
the label. It seems an acceptable solution to apply the same criteria for both stages. This 
is also in line with the spirit of the directive.  
 
2.3 Proposal for amending the public procurement directive 
 
The current legislation on public procurement is already eight years old. Union policies 
have developed since and the current economic situation also begs legal change that 
would facilitate economic growth. On a wider backdrop, the Commission proposal on 
20.12.2011 facilitates two policy papers97, the Europe 2020 –strategy and the new 
Single Market Act proposal.98 99 This chapter will first present an outlook on two 
Commission initiatives directly related to the proposal and then an overview of the 
relevant parts of the proposal. A critical analysis of the proposal, contrasted to the 
underlying policy objectives, will then be delivered. 
 
2.3.1 Policy context 
 
The proposal has two complementary goals: to increase the efficiency of public 
procurement and to better facilitate the use of public procurement for furthering other 
societal policy goals.100 Efficiency means better value money in the way of savings or 
better products. The auxiliary policy goals can be related for example to employment, 
innovation or environmental protection. These goals, while supposedly making single 
procurement contracts more expensive, will on the long run complement the goal of a 
more efficient procurement regime and cutting down public expenditure. Although not 
explicitly stated in the proposal, the other societal goals seem to also have independent 
                                                             
97 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement, 
COM(2011) 896 final. 
98 EUROPE 2020 S strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. 
99 Single Market Act, ’Working together to create new growth’, COM(2011) 206 final. 
100 COM(2011) 896 final, p. 2. 
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value as such, since these ideas are mentioned in the Treaties and a vast array of 
different policy papers. 
In 2008 the Commission issued a communication entitled Public procurement for a 
better environment.101 The  communication  identifies  obstacles  to  the  use  of  GPP  and  
presents the Commissions views on tackling them. The main obstacle is the lack of 
common GPP criteria and policy which results in disparities in the internal market.102 
The distinguished specific obstacles that the communication is supposed to tackle are i) 
lack of common GPP criteria, ii) lack of information on LCA, iii) uncertainty on legal 
possibilities to utilise GPP and practical issues related to the procurement process and 
iv) no political support for GPP. The first and the third problems are relevant for this 
study. 
According to the accompanying Commission staff working document stakeholders want 
clarification  on  the  possibility  to  introduce  NPR  PPM  requirements  to  the  technical  
specifications.103 The  Commission’s  reply  is  that  under  the  current  directive  they  can  
only be used if ‘those criteria are relevant for characterising the product’.104 In  other  
words, they cannot be used solely for environmental reasons. 
The divergence between national GPP policies and the lack of a common Union policy 
raises administrative costs and also creates obstacles to the free movement of goods.105 
The Commission thinks that the administrative costs of GPP to companies, proving 
compliance to the technical specifications, might be too high. National divergence can 
also be created by the fact that the Concordia ruling effectively provides an exception 
under which member states can derogate from the mutual recognition principle of 
Cassis. Environmental reasons can be used to disqualify a tender, which in practice can 
lead to favouring companies from certain areas.106  
The document then discusses the different options for solving these problems. The 
Commissions view on the effect of guidance on GPP seems rather optimistic. Mere 
guidance would not solve the legal issues if the state of law is unclear. Guidance would 
help in the uptake of GPP for example in the form of ready-made technical standards for 
environmentally friendly products. The EU Ecolabel and the 26 incorporated product 
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groups are an example of this. Bolder options would be to introduce mandatory targets 
for the use of GPP or to make GPP mandatory for certain product groups. Using 
necessity would remove both of the problems since rules on what has to be done, in all 
member states, would be introduced. The conclusion of the Commission communication 
is that voluntary measures should be endorsed and common criteria for GPP created and 
guidance provided by the Commission to facilitate the chosen approach.107 
The actual amendment process was started with a green paper in 2011.108 The paper 
analyses both ‘how to buy’ and ‘what to buy’ reform possibilities in the light of the 
2020 strategy and the new Single Market Act. ‘How to buy’ are the procedural rules of 
the procurement process that define what is possible and what not. ‘What to buy’ is the 
policy side of the issue; should the uptake of GPP be based on incentives or should it be 
made mandatory? I will cover the central issues of both approaches. 
The paper reiterates that the PPM requirements have to be linked to the subject matter 
of the contract and somehow contribute to the end characteristics of the product, either 
visible or invisible.109 It acknowledges that relaxing this criterion would allow utilising 
public procurement more effectively to support other societal goals. The down-sides of 
this change are also analysed.110   
The main focus of the procurement process might switch from buying the best product 
to pursuing a specific policy and thus leading astray from the original purpose of using 
public funds efficiently. Public procurement rules might also be entangled with the rules 
on state aid. The current system of purchasing the best product with the cheapest price 
assures that no indirect state aid is generated through public procurement. The societal 
goals might enable discrimination. For example requiring solar power discriminates 
against northern regions where producing it is not cost-effective. A link to the subject-
matter also guarantees some degree of certainty and predictability; purchasing the 
cheapest  product  that  fulfils  the  set  criteria  or  every  authority  having  their  own set  of  
societal goals. Ultimately economic growth might be affected if companies started to 
base their actions on corporate policies instead of trying to develop the best possible 
products to increase their market shares and profits. 
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A  number  of  member  states  already  have  local  policies  on  what  to  buy.111 These are 
policies that govern mandatory requirements of the purchased products or targets on the 
amount of products purchased that have to be ‘green’. The problem with this is that it 
creates divergence since the local policies are not based on uniform standards. This does 
not facilitate the free movement of goods. Some legislation already exists on this matter, 
for example the energy star regulation and the clean vehicles directive.112  
The paper recognises that the ‘what to buy’ instruments are effective for both pursuing 
the societal goals and also harmonising the markets for the sake of free movement of 
goods. Possible risks of this approach are discrimination and ineffectiveness. The 
decision on what to buy will strongly influence the markets and it might discriminate 
some companies. At the same time, the local purchasing authorities have the best 
knowledge about their needs, not the Brussels bureaucrats. Possible solutions for these 
problems are also presented. Imposing obligations only on the characteristics of the 
products would not limit the free movement of goods as much as strict requirements on 
their technical specifications. Financial incentives to purchase greener would not create 
such administrative burdens as direct obligations might.113 
Kotsonis presents strong criticism against the ideas of the green paper.114 His main point 
of argument is that the current directive allows for sufficient regard to different societal 
policies while still keeping the functioning of the internal market as its starting point. 
The possibilities presented in the green paper would turn this stance on its head; a 
switch  from  protecting  the  rights  of  the  suppliers  to  fostering  local  policies,  since  
purchasing authorities are mainly local. He specifically notes that the presented ideas 
would reduce legal certainty and make the award of contracts arbitrary and 
discriminatory. The ‘what to buy’ obligations represent an outdated centrally lead 
economy and they would actually make it harder for local purchasing authorities to act 
according to the law. In addition, some of the proposals might be against the World 
Trade Organisations Agreement on Government Procurement, which the Union is a 
signatoree to. 
 
                                                             
111 For an overview of member states’ actions, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/action_plan_en.htm, 
sourced 13.3.2012. 
112 Regulation (EC) No 106/2008 and Directive 2009/33/EC. 
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2.3.2 Proposed amendments 
 
The actual proposal is not as radical as one might have anticipated based on the 
different policy papers. 115 The proposal has the same legal basis as the current directive: 
articles 53 (1), 62 and 114 TFEU. The last one indicates that it is still foremost an 
internal market harmonisations measure and that the environmental goals are just 
auxiliary. The proposal states that it complies with the principle of subsidiarity because 
prior experiences have shown that Union procurement legislation has been effective and 
that divergent national policies would set obstacles to the free movement of goods. The 
statement on compliance with the proportionality principle bluntly reads that the 
proposal does comply ‘since it does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve 
the objective’. This argument is rather circular. Since the proposal does not extrapolated 
more  on  this  issue  I  have  to  assume  that  it  refers  to  the  fact  that  the  proposal  is  a  
minimum harmonisation measure. 
There are three specific propositions targeted at enabling the strategic use of public 
procurement to purport environmental goals.116 The possibility to use life-cycle costs as 
award criteria. These costs would include everything from the production to the disposal 
as  well  as  externalities,  if  they  can  be  monetised.  The  possibility  to  create  technical  
specifications and award criteria that ‘refer to all factors directly linked to the 
production processes’. These have to be related to the subject matter of the contract. The 
possibility that purchasing authorities may require that the product bears a specific eco-
label. Equivalent labels or other means of proof of compliance with the specified label 
have to be accepted also. 
Article 66 of the proposal specifies that life-cycle costing can be taken into account on 
both award criteria: the most economically advantageous tender and the lowest cost. 
Article 67 then defines what can be included into life-cycle costs. The articles go into 
detail on what life-cycle costs are and how can they be used as award criteria but the 
end result is not that different then under article 53 of the current directive. The current 
directive allows for the award criteria for the most economically advantageous offer to 
include price, environmental characteristics, running costs and cost-effectiveness. The 
proposal  only  clarifies  what  is  already  possible  according  to  the  law.  Of  course  clear  
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and precise norms are always welcome but the proposed change is not that significant in 
practice. 
Technical specifications are regulated in article 40 of the proposal. The first two 
paragraphs state in general terms that technical specifications may refer to a specific 
process of production but that the specifications shall not create obstacles to free 
movement and competition. The current division into performance or functional 
requirements and technical specifications is maintained in paragraph three. Paragraph 
four specifies that the technical specifications shall not refer to a particular process or 
origin of production with the effect of eliminating certain products from the tender 
competition. As an exception, such references are only possible if the technical 
specifications cannot be defined in any other way and if they are ‘justified by the 
subject-matter of the contract’. This means that NPR PPM requirements are not 
allowed. The exception only concerns a reference to a specific product in situations 
where this is the only way of defining the wanted product. In this case the idea is that 
the offering companies would produce their own version of the mentioned product. The 
content of the article is effectively the same as of article 23 of the current directive.  
Article 41 regulates that contracting authorities can require an eco-label from the 
purchased product. This will be either in the form of a performance or a functional 
requirement as defined in article 40. Article 41 specifies what criteria the eco-label has 
to  fulfil  so  that  it  can  be  used  as  a  requirement.  The  article  also  states  that  other  
equivalent labels and other means of proof of compliance with the specified eco-label 
have  to  be  accepted.  Article  23  (6)  of  the  current  directive  only  allows  for  the  
performance or functional requirements to be drafted on the basis of an eco-label. The 
practical outcome of the proposed directive is still the same as of the current directive 
since the products don’t actually have to have the specified label, it is enough that they 
comply with it. The conditions that the label has to conform to in order to be used in the 
procurement process are the same in the proposal and the current directive.  
Article  41  (2)  of  the  proposal  specifies  that  if  some requirements  for  the  award  of  an  
eco-label do not conform to the first condition set to the use of labels in the procurement 
process, that it has to concern ‘characteristics which are linked to the subject-matter of 
the contract’, that the remaining requirements can still be used when drafting the call for 
tenders. This second paragraph makes it even clearer that it is not allowed to set NPR 
PPM requirements to the products being procured.  
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2.3.3 Analysis 
 
To sum up the above said, the proposed changes have little or no actual effect compared 
to the current state of law. Considering the hype presented in the policy papers one 
would have expected more. Still, there is something good in the proposition. In general, 
it clarifies many issues related to GPP. Bringing life-cycle costing onto the stage is a 
welcomed change. Although not a legally powerful tool, highlighting what it is and how 
it is used will probably affect the actions of purchasing authorities and stimulate the 
uptake of GPP throughout the Union. 
The standing of NPR PPM requirements is clarified. Even though still not completely 
explicitly stated, their use as technical requirements would not be allowed. Kunzlik’s 
hope  that  the  ECJ  would  give  a  ruling  on  this  issue  is  still  relevant  because  the  
possibility to require them is important in the light of the environmental aims of the 
proposal.117 Kunzlik’s first two arguments would still be valid if the proposal would be 
enacted: i) allowing NPR PPM requirements would be in favour of the integration 
principle in article 11 TFEU, and ii) the problem with the ‘invisible’ characteristics of a 
product stemming from the Wienstrom decision is still  not solved. 
The proposition would not strengthen the possibility to use eco-labels in public 
procurement. They would still be left as administrative tools for the purchasing 
authorities when defining technical specification since no absolute mandatory 
requirements could be set. My earlier conclusions on this issue still apply.118 
The proposed changes do not diminish national divergences in procurement practices 
and thus competition and free movement conditions are not maximised. Since no ‘what 
to buy’ obligations would be set differences in national environmental policies (or the 
lack of) will favour different products. Furthermore, because the use of European 
standards, or European eco-labels, to define technical specifications is only a 
recommendation national purchasing authorities will continue to use local variants. 
According the article 40 (3) (b) of the proposal and article 23 (3) (a) of the current 
directive state that preference should be given the European standards when defining 
technical specifications, but this is not an obligation. ‘What to buy’ rules would 
maximize integration of environmental protection into procurement policy and they 
                                                             
117 Kunzlik 2005, p. 136. 
118 See chapter 2.2.3 above. 
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would also deal with the problems related to diversification as a barrier to trade. On the 
other hand, it has been argued that such obligations would only make the procurement 
regime ineffective and that it should be the member states that make the decision of 
integrating secondary policies since they are the ones paying for it.119 This view 
presupposes that integration of secondary policies will bring more costs, but as the 
discussion on life-cycle costing shows this is not certainly true. 
Overall, it seems that the Commission retains the stance that the primary purpose of the 
Union and public procurement is an economic one. With this mind-set, basing the 
changes on article 114 TFEU and taking the functioning of the internal market as its 
primary objectives the proposed changes are justified. From the environmentalists view 
point they are not the most effective ones but this is as far as the Union can go while 
still retaining the four freedoms and the rights of the economic operators at peak. 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
The current public procurement directive is based on the assumption that the primary 
aim of the Union and public procurement is the functioning of the internal market. The 
principle of non-discrimination is central in guaranteeing the rights of economic 
operators inside the common market. Public procurement is a strong tool for pursuing 
environmental goals. Secondary environmental goals are recognized by the Commission 
and the ECJ as legitimate but still they are not allowed to reach their maximum 
potential. The biggest obstacle is the requirement that technical specifications and award 
criteria have to be linked to the subject matter of the contract. In particular the 
prohibition of NPR PPM requirements is withholding GPP from reaching its full 
effectiveness.  The  reasons  for  this  are  not  coherent  and  do  not  hold  up  to  critical  
analysis. 
Minimum harmonisation is meant to allow national diversification and to counter 
balance  the  economic  aims  of  the  Union  with  national  social  aims.  The  side  effect  of  
this is that union measures are not as effective as they could be, since they stop at the 
minimum level. This problem is evident in the area of my thesis. The problem is 
enhanced by the fact that even if stricter national measures were allowed, they would 
                                                             
119 Boyle 2011, p. 177. 
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only impact a small percentage of the whole public supply market. They would only 
effect procurement at the state employing the stricter rules. For the full potential of GPP 
to be exploited the Union should make it a mandatory policy. The integration principle 
of article 11 TFEU is calling for this to take place. 
The Commission proposal for amending the procurement directive offers a few positive, 
but rather minor changes. It could have taken a bolder approach to issues that would 
enable more efficient use of GPP or it could have even made it mandatory in some 
respects. The Commission does not have to worry about how far it can go when trying 
to purport secondary policies since the ECJ can always be called to assess the legality of 
secondary legislation under article 263 TFEU. This would of course require that the 
Commission  wanted  to  adopt  a  more  pro-environment  approach.  In  spite  of  what  is  
written  in  the  different  policy  papers  this  seems  not  to  be  the  case,  or  either  the  
Commission is just stuck with its view of retaining the old approach to secondary 
policies. 
Eco-labels have been given a supporting role in public procurement. They function well 
in that respect but they could be used more efficiently. Especially the problems related 
to  divergent  national  measures  and  also  to  procedural  issues  and  cost-effectiveness  of  
the process itself could be resolved by allowing to require that the products bare a 
specific label. The EU Ecolabel would be most suitable for this. 
A further point to consider is the divergence that exists between the different legal acts 
affecting GPP. The approach adopted by the clean vehicles directive differs from that of 
the public procurement directive.120 The legal basis of the clean vehicles directive is 
article 192 TEFU so it is aimed at protecting the environment. It can be considered as 
complementary to directive 2004/18/EC since it regulates specifically what purchasing 
authorities have to take into consideration when purchasing vehicles. The directive also 
applies to contracts signed under the public service regulation.121 
According to the clean vehicles directive environmental issues have to be considered in 
the award procedure. This can be done by either setting technical specifications or 
award criteria that take into consideration the operational environmental impacts of the 
                                                             
120 Directive 2009/33/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on the 
promotion of clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles. 
121 Regulation (EC) No 1370/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on 
public passenger transport services by rail and by road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) Nos 
1191/69 and 1107/70. 
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used vehicles (article 5). The directive stipulates that at least energy consumption and 
different types of emissions have to be considered. In addition, it leaves the contracting 
authorities the possibility to employ other environmental criteria in their decision also. 
The aim of the directive is to reduce emissions and also to increase the innovation and 
supply of environmentally friendly vehicles to the markets. The directive effectively 
makes GPP a mandatory policy in the area of vehicle procurement and public transport. 
The directive does not set specific ‘what to buy’ obligations for purchasing authorities, 
but it does force them to buy the most environmentally friendly alternative. Why is GPP 
given such status only in a small and specific fields of procurement law? 
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3. The EU eco-labelling regime 
 
3.1 Product labelling and standardisation 
 
Standardisation of products has long been one of the ways that the EU has used to 
construct the internal market and support the free movement of goods. The former 
policy was to introduce legislation that would standardise products throughout the 
Union. In the 1980’s the Union started to shift from this full harmonisation approach to 
the current way of minimum harmonisation of product standards, often referred to as 
‘the new approach’.122 Product labelling is one element of this standardisation of 
products. The new approach also includes using incentive based instruments rather than 
direct control when pursuing environmental goals.123 Eco-labels  are  one  example  of  
this.  
Product labels can roughly be divided into three categories: i) mandatory labels that 
imply that the product complies with mandatory legal standards, ii) voluntary labels that 
specify that the product is in some way superior to non-labelled products, eco-labels 
being one example of this group, and iii) labels that indicate that the product is 
hazardous or detrimental in some way, these labels are usually mandatory. 
The CE-mark serves as a good example of the first group. In brief, the CE-mark is based 
on regulation (EC) 765/2008 and other product specific legislation. The mark is 
mandatory for some products groups. It indicates that the product bearing the mark 
complies with mandatory Union standards set for those products. A product that has 
obtained the CE-mark can be freely circulated within the internal market. The aim of the 
CE-mark, and other similar labels, is to set the minimum standards for products to 
ensure  that  they  are  safe  and  to  facilitate  the  free  movement  of  goods  in  the  internal  
market. 
Voluntary labelling that indicates that the product is in some way superior to other 
products of the same product group is one expression of the new approach that the 
Union has adopted. The new approach focuses on minimum standards and introduces 
                                                             
122 Chalmers 2010, p. 696. 
123 Kingston 2012, p. 41. 
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economic incentives for companies to push further on the desired policy are.124 In the 
case  of  eco-labels  the  policy  area  is  the  protection  of  the  environment.  Eco-labels  are  
meant to inform the consumer about the environmental aspects of the product and thus 
help her to make an informed decision on which product to purchase. In this way they 
serve as an incentive for companies to develop their products to a more environmentally 
sustainable direction while still trying to pursue economic profits. The EU has adopted 
various labels that function along this pattern. 
The third group of labels concerns the protection of the consumer or the environment in 
some way. The tobacco directive 2001/37/EC suffices as an example. According to 
article five of the directive tobacco products have to indicate how much tar, nicotine and 
carbon monoxide they yield and they must carry a warning sign that indicates that the 
product is hazardous to health. The aim of the directive is to approximate certain 
measures in member states (namely the labelling of tobacco products) so that a high 
level of health protection can be assured.  
Krämer categorizes specific environmental labels under the last two categories.125  In  
my view, a strict division into these three categories is not fruitful. Even the term ‘eco-
label’ is not unequivocally defined in the legal context. That said, the labels that this 
study focuses on are situated into the first and second category, based on their aims and 
whether or not they are voluntary or compulsory. All the so called ‘eco-labels’, a label 
that purports environmental goals, that the Union has adopted are also aimed at the 
functioning of the internal market and the free movement of goods, if not directly they 
at least incidentally have this effect also. I classify the aim of energy efficiency of 
article 194 TFEU, on which the energy label directive is based on, belonging under the 
wide umbrella on environmental protection.126 
Different national product labels are excluded from this study. Just as a side note, these 
national measures fall under article 34 TFEU and the Cassis de Dijon interpretation of 
it.  They  are  product  rules  which  affect  the  free  movement  of  products  and  have  to  be  
justified under article 36 TFEU or the mandatory requirements.127 
 
                                                             
124 Chalmers 2010, p. 696. 
125 Krämer 2007, p. 259. 
126 See Vedder 2010, p. 291 on how the Union energy policy might be restricted because it is linked to the 
internal market, which entails free movement of goods and undistorted conditions of competition. 
127 Chalmers 2010, p. 770. See also chapter 1.2. 
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3.2 Objectives and development of the eco-labelling regime 
 
The European Union has adopted an integrated product policy (IPP) which means that 
measures aimed at lowering the environmental impact of products are integrated into 
other product policies.128 The IPP is based on a life-cycle analysis (LCA) that observes 
the production, use and disposal stages of a products life. According to it the most 
effective way to impact products is when they are designed. Informing the consumer 
about  the  effects  of  products  is  also  a  key  element  of  the  Union’s  approach.  The  
informed consumer is supposed to contribute to the reduction of energy consumption 
and waste production.  
The Green Paper acknowledges public procurement as a powerful tool for affecting the 
environmental goals since the total amount of products purchased by public authorities 
is  so  vast.  The  paper  noted  that  for  this  to  take  place  the  law  and  administrative  
practices need to be developed and knowledge spread out.129  Since then the Concordia 
case and the amendment of the public procurement directive have allowed for 
environmental criteria to be considered in the procurement process. The Commission 
has  also  published  two handbooks  on  GPP which  give  out  practical  advice  on  how to  
implement the policy. Altogether 26 product groups have been included to the EU 
Ecolabel which the purchasing authorities can easily use to specify technical criteria for 
products being acquired. The paper also identified the need to develop environmental 
standards along with other product standards. As the next chapter of this study will 
point out, this development too has come about.  
The Union has had environmental action programmes since the 1970s. They are policy 
papers which plot out future perspectives and legislation in the field of environmental 
policy.130 131 Currently in action is the 6th programme.132 It was initiated in 2002. It took 
IPP and LCA as major components in the work for improving environmental 
performance and sustainable production. Another key factor in the programme is 
involving the enterprises and consumers in reaching the above mentioned goals. 
Incentives and information are supposed to be used to effect production and 
                                                             
128 Green Paper on Integrated Product Policy, COM(2001) 68. 
129 Ibid., p, 15. 
130 http://www.ieep.eu/work-areas/governance/environmental-action-programmes, sourced 2.2.1012 
131 See Scheuer 2005 Chapter III for a review on all of the six environmental programmes. 
132 The 6th community environment action programme, Decision No 1600/2002/EC. 
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consumption.133 The different labels introduced by the Union provide a possibility for 
this.134 Article  3  (6)  of  the  programme  states  that  Union  GPP  policy  should  ‘allow  
integration of environmental life cycle, including the production phase, concerns in the 
procurement procedures while respecting Community competition rules and the internal 
market’. This wish has not been granted. As pointed out in the previous chapter the 
possibility to use NPR PPMs is not possible according to the current procurement 
directive or even the new proposal. 
The Union has continued to develop the IPP and LCA approaches.135 In the 2003 policy 
paper the main issue regarding GPP was to ensure that the existing legal possibilities to 
utilise it are used. A list of practical measures was drawn up which the Commission has 
carried out since. The paper also stated that the scope of labels still needs to be 
expanded. Enforcement of the misleading advertising directive would root out 
advertising of environmental characteristics of products that did not have a scientific 
basis and thus give more visibility to the products with registered eco-labels.136 Finally, 
the paper also notified that IPP needs to be considered in other policy areas than just the 
environment. This is in line with the integration principle of article 11 TFEU.  
The development of the eco-labelling regime has been goal oriented and a link to public 
procurement has existed throughout. This development can be seen as one implication 
of  the  integration  principle  of  article  11  TFEU.  Krämer  thinks  that  the  new  approach  
does not effectively enough drive the environmental goals but only the health and safety 
of consumers.137 One reason for this might be that the policy internalizes external 
costs.138 The incentive and information based approach is countered by the fact that the 
environmentally friendly products are more expensive to the end consumer, be it a 
private or public body. Economic criteria often go before ecological.  
 
                                                             
133 Ibid., article 3 (5). 
134 Studies have shown that eco-labels do effect consumer choices, see Thøgersen 2002. The number of 
registrations under the EU Ecolabel has grown every year since its introduction in 1992, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/about_ecolabel/facts_and_figures_en.htm, sourced 13.3.2012. 
135 Integrated Product Policy – Building on Environmental Life-Cycle Thinking, COM(2003) 302 final. 
136 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market, the current version of the 
directive is usually referred to as the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. 
137 Krämer 2007, p. 225. 
138 Jans 2008, p. 336. 
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3.3 Analysis of specific labels 
 
The EU has issued various product labels that focus on the environmental performance 
of the product. Other labels, or common standards for a specific industry, also exist, 
such as the ones for buildings, renewable energy and services.139 Because of the limited 
scope of a thesis I have had to limit the study to only a few of them. I have chosen the 
pieces of legislation that produce actual labels, in the sense that consumers are used to 
seeing labels on products. These are also products that public bodies purchase through 
the procurement processes. The chosen product groups are also simpler, both in the 
factual sense but also the legislation concerning them, then the other possible groups. 
This helps to keep the focus of the study together. In addition to these labels I will 
briefly discuss the EMAS regulation and compare its legal standing in the procurement 
process to those of the eco-labels.140  
A common aspect to these norms is framework regulation.141 The eco-design directive 
and the energy label directive are both framework directives. The have been adopted by 
the Council and the Parliament according to the ordinary legislative procedure set out in 
article 294 TFEU. The directives set out the aims, functions and common principles but 
the specific details are then enacted by the Commission through delegated regulations. 
In both of the examples when a new product group is added to the scope of the directive 
it is done through a Commission regulation defining the relevant matters for those 
products. This seems to be a solid practice since the drawing up of the criteria is left to 
specialist bodies. 
 
  
                                                             
139 See for example Directive 2010/31/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 
on the energy performance of buildings, and Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources. 
140 Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme 
(EMAS). 
141 Preschal 2006, p. 15. 
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3.3.1 Energy Star Regulation 
 
The regulation is based on an agreement between the Government of the United States 
of America and the European Union.142 The Energy Star label was originally introduced 
by the US government Department of Energy in 1992. The label defines energy 
efficiency standards for office equipment. It was taken as a mandatory requirement for 
public purchasing of office equipment and thus quickly gained status as an international 
standard for these products.143 The EU joined the agreement in 2001 and enacted the 
original regulation that was then amended by the current regulation.144 
The aims of the regulation are energy efficiency (recital  2),  functioning of the internal 
market (recital 4) and minimising the impacts of energy efficiency requirements on the 
free movement of goods (recital 5). The legal basis of the regulation is article 192 (1) 
TFEU which means that it is primarily aimed at pursuing an environmental goal. 
Participation to the programme is voluntary according to article 4 (3). Companies that 
want to apply for the label can do so but products are not obliged to carry the label. 
According to article 6 of the regulation Union institutions and member states central 
government authorities have to purchase office equipment that comply with the 
minimum energy efficiency requirements of the regulation. This requirement only 
applies if the minimum threshold for the value of the contract exceeds that defined in 
article 7 of the public procurement directive. What is classified as a central government 
authority is also defined according to that directive. 
What this means is, when purchasing authorities procure office equipment that’s value 
exceeds the set threshold they have to define the technical specifications according to 
the minimum requirements set by the Energy Star label. Products that carry the Energy 
Star label automatically fulfil the specified criteria but other products can also be 
purchased. These products have the possibility of providing other proof that they fulfil 
the specified efficiency criteria. This is in line with the norm in the public procurement 
directive that specifies that technical specifications that refer to a certain standard, label 
or mark have to be accompanied by the words ‘or equivalent’. 
                                                             
142 Regulation (EC) No 106/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 January 2008 on a 
Community energy-efficiency labelling programme for office equipment. 
143 www.eu-energystar.org/en/203.shtml, sourced 27.1.2012. 
144 Regulation (EC) No 2422/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 November 2001 on 
a Community energy efficiency labelling programme for office equipment. 
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3.3.2 Energy Label Directive 
 
The directive is based on the EUs agenda to fight climate change and to cut down 
carbon dioxide emissions.145 146 The first version of the directive was adopted already in 
1979.147 It  was  based  on  various  policy  papers  adopted  in  the  1970s  that  aimed  at  
rationalising the use of energy but still enabling social and economic growth. The 
current directive is one of the tools used for pursuing the Union’s goals of the 2020 
strategy.148 
The aims of the directive are to achieve energy savings and environmental gains (recital 
2). This is to be achieved by labelling products and thus enabling the informed 
consumer to make decision that cut down energy consumption and also benefits the 
economy overall (recitals 4, 5 and 8). The legal basis of the directive is article 194 (2) 
TFEU which means that it is aimed at improving the functioning of the internal market 
and also to promote energy efficiency and energy saving. The original proposal of the 
directive was based on article 114 TFEU which meant that  it  was aimed purely at  the 
functioning of the internal market.149 During  the  process  of  adapting  the  directive  the  
Treaty of Lisbon was passed, which introduced a new legal basis, article 194 TFEU. 
The legal basis of the directive was then switched to this. 
Under article 5 of the directive suppliers of products covered by the directive have to 
provide their products with a label that indicates how much energy the product 
consumes and how energy efficient it is compared to other products. Equally, article 6 
obliges the dealers of such products to keep these labels visible. Labelling the products 
covered by the directive is mandatory but the directive does not set any technical 
specifications for the products or their energy efficiency. 
                                                             
145 Directive 2010/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 May 2010 on the 
indication by labelling and standard product information of the consumption of energy and other 
resources by energy-related products. 
146 Climate change was added to the Union’s objectives in the Lisbon Treaty, see article 191 (1) TFEU. 
After this a separate DG has been established to combat climate change, DG Clima. The 2020 –strategy is 
one policy paper which focuses on combatting climate change. 
147 Council Directive 79/530/EEC of 14 May 1979 on the indication by labelling of the energy 
consumption of household appliances. See also the various policy papers referred to in the preamble of 
the directive.  
148 EUROPE 2020 A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, COM(2010) 2020 final. See 
also the Commission website for more information on the strategy: 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/index_en.htm. 
149 Proposal of the Commission COM(2008) 778 final. 
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As part of the holistic approach that the Union has adopted towards protecting the 
environment and reducing CO2 emissions, this directive also recognises the potential 
that public procurement has on impacting this development. First off, recital 16 
recognises the possibilities that using the energy labels and defined energy efficiency 
classes  to  guide  public  procurement  in  the  member  states  can  be  an  effective  way  of  
impacting  the  environmental  goals.  On  the  other  hand,  recital  18  declares  that  
promoting procurement of energy efficient products should not be to the detriment of 
the overall environmental performance and functioning of such products. Article 9 
regulates that contracting authorities ‘shall endeavour’ to procure only products 
belonging to the highest energy performance class, or equivalent. This is not an 
obligation, only a recommendation. For that reason, for example in Finland no 
obligations relating to this issue were taken to the national law implementing the 
directive.150  
 
3.3.3 Ecolabel Regulation 
 
The original version of the Ecolabel regulation was given in 1992.151 The regulation was 
aimed at reducing the environmental impact of products throughout their lifecycle by 
informing consumers of the environmental effects of products and indicating by 
labelling which products are less detrimental. The current regulation continues on the 
same path and advocates the Sustainable Consumption and Product policy framework of 
the Commission, emphasised for example in the 6th Environmental Action Programme. 
The aim of the directive is to promote the use of products with a reduced environmental 
impact during their life cycle (recitals 1 and 5). The legal basis of the regulation is 
article 192 (1) TFEU which means that it is primarily aimed at pursuing an 
environmental goal. The label is supposed to comply especially with the precautionary 
principle in article 191 (2) TFEU. 
The regulation sets out a voluntary labelling scheme to which interested companies can 
apply to register. The accepted products are allowed to bear the label. Currently 26 
                                                             
150 HE 109/2010 vp, p. 5. The government proposal on the implementing law states, ‘Since it is not a 
mandatory obligation, article 9 of the directive will be implemented with various recommendations 
relating to public procurement.’ (Translated by TT) 
151 Council Regulation (EEC) No 880/92 of 23 March 1992 on a Community eco-label award scheme. 
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different product groups have been taken into the scheme of the label. These include for 
example dishwashing detergents, lubricants, light sources and notebook computers. 
New product groups are established by a decision of the Commission.152 The regulation 
entails specific rules on defining specifications for product groups and the awarding of 
the label. Recital 4 necessitates that the specifications of this regulation are to comply 
with the ones of the Eco-design directive. This means that for a product that has to 
comply with the eco-design directive the Ecolabel serves as a ‘label of excellence’. The 
label indicates that that product is better in environmental terms than products that just 
bear the mandatory eco-design label. 
Recital  14  of  the  regulation  states  that  member  states  should  consider  guidelines  and  
targets for their national GPP action plans. Apparently it is meant that the label’s criteria 
could be used as guidelines when defining technical specifications for products being 
procured.153 The directive on public procurement also mentions that this is possible. 
 
3.3.4 Eco-design Directive 
 
The directive was first introduced in 2005.154 Prior to this there already existed product 
specific legislation on different electricity and gas consuming household appliances.155 
The directive is linked to the Union’s 2020 strategy and specifically The Action Plan for 
Energy Efficiency.156 The Eco-design directive introduces a different approach to 
reducing energy consumption than the EU Ecolabel directive. Labels aim at consumers 
choosing products which use little energy during their operation while the eco-design 
directive effects the whole life cycle of the product. The directive affects the production, 
use and disposal stages of the products life-cycle. 
The  aim  of  the  directive  is  to  ensure  the  free  movement  of  goods  within  the  internal  
market by harmonising national measures related to the design of energy consuming 
products (recital 2 and article 1). The directive also aims at reducing energy 
consumption and contributes to the aim of sustainable development (recital 3). Products 
                                                             
152 The newest being Commission Decision of 28 June 2011 on establishing the ecological criteria for the 
award of the EU Ecolabel to all-purpose cleaners and sanitary cleaners. 
153 This is stated in the proposal of the regulation. See COM(2008) 401 final, p. 3. 
154 Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2005 establishing a 
framework for the setting of ecodesign requirements for energy-using products. 
155 Directives 92/42/EEC, 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC. 
156 COM(2006) 545 final. 
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that comply with the directive should be able to move freely inside the internal market 
(recital 8). The legal basis of the directive is article 114 TFEU which means that it is an 
internal market harmonisation measure. If the directive were enacted post Lisbon its 
legal basis might have been article 194 TFEU, as with the Energy Label directive, since 
it is primarily an internal market measure and secondarily an environmental measure. 
The directive sets minimum requirements that products have to fulfil in order to be 
granted the CE-mark and access to the internal market. It is a framework directive and 
the Commission gives out regulations about the technical specification related to each 
product group. Compliance with the directive is mandatory.  
The  directive  does  not  have  any  direct  relevance  for  public  procurement.  The  
Commission proposal for the directive mentions that the framework created by it ‘will 
also be the essential building block for an integrated sustainable environmental product 
policy, as complemented by initiatives on labelling and incentives relating to public 
procurement and taxation’.157 This comment is not dealt with in more detail in the 
proposal and the directive itself does not have any mention of public procurement. This 
comment in the proposal just emphasises the holistic approach the Commission has 
adopted towards environmental protection, it wants to utilise all possible tools for this 
goal. Since the requirements set by the directive are mandatory purchasing authorities 
can only purchase products which comply with the set criteria.  
 
3.3.5 EMAS Regulation 
 
The eco-management and audit scheme (EMAS) was established in 1993.158 The aims 
of the scheme have remained the same in the latest amended version of the 
regulation.159 In its newest environmental action plan the Union recognises that in order 
for it to reach its environmental and sustainable development goals it has to get the 
                                                             
157 Commission proposal COM(2008) 399 final, p. 2. 
158 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1836/93 of 29 June 1993 allowing voluntary participation by companies 
in the industrial sector in a Community eco-management and audit scheme. 
159 Regulation (EC) No 1221/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 
on the voluntary participation by organisations in a Community eco-management and audit scheme 
(EMAS). 
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industry involved also.160 Article 3 (5) of the program recognises the EMAS as a tool 
for this. 
According to the first article the main aim of the EMAS regulation is to ‘promote 
continuous improvements in the environmental performance of organisations’. The legal 
basis  of  the  regulation  is  article  192  (1)  TFEU  which  means  that  it  is  aimed  towards  
environmental protection. 
Participation to the scheme is voluntary. Requirements for registration are set out in 
article 4. The company must have an environmental management system that comprises 
of policy, objectives and targets. The company will be audited and it must give out a 
statement about the actions it has taken. In practice the requirements mean that the 
company takes care of environmental issues throughout its functions. Admitted 
companies  can  use  the  EMAS-logo on  their  materials,  such  as  official  documents  and  
advertisements. According to article 10 (4) the company cannot use the logo on its 
products since the EMAS is not a product standard. 
The way that the EMAS can be utilised in public procurement differs a bit from the 
different eco-labels but the practical outcome is the same in both cases. According to 
article 48 (2) (f) of the public procurement directive the purchasing authority can 
require evidence from the tendering companies of their abilities to apply environmental 
management measures when fulfilling the contract. This possibility only applies to 
public work and service contracts and not to the supply of public goods. Article 50 
specifies that the purchasing authority can require that the company is registered under 
the EMAS scheme. Registration under other similar schemes can also be required. If the 
tendering company is not registered under the required scheme they can use other 
means of proving compliance with the criteria defined in the scheme. 
If compared to article 23 about the technical specifications defining the products being 
purchased, there seems to be a slight difference in degree. According to article 23 (6) 
the specification can only be based on eco-labels but the direct requiring of the label is 
not allowed. This means that in both situations companies that are not registered, or 
whose  products  do  not  bare  the  label,  can  be  admitted  if  they  can  give  evidence  that  
they fulfil the set criteria. Thus, in neither situation nobody is discriminated and 
everybody has an equal chance of participating into the tendering process. 
                                                             
160 6th Community Environment Action Programme, decision no 1600/2002/EC. 
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3.4 Conclusions 
 
 Even though all of the addressed labels have been reformed since, Krämer’s conclusion 
on the state of the whole labelling regime is still relevant. He thinks that the different 
labels that the Union has adopted do not form a coherent system that would advance the 
desired aims in the most efficient way possible.161 
One aspect is the legal basis of the acts. They are based on three different articles: 114, 
192 (1) and 194 (2) TFEU. According to settled case law the legal basis for a measure 
must be chosen according to the aim and content of the measure. If a measure pursues 
two objectives the primary objective should be used to define the legal basis. If the 
measure has two objectives, out of which neither one is subordinate nor incidental to the 
other, the measure has to be founded on both of these legal bases.162 Furthermore, the 
fact that whether or not the labelling scheme is mandatory or not does not affect what is 
the correct legal basis.163 Considering Union competence on this issue, it does not 
matter which one of the three articles is chosen as the legal basis for the measure, since 
all three of the policy areas fall under the area of shared competence according to article 
4 TFEU. However, there is a difference in what is the primary objective of the measure. 
Is it the functioning of the internal market or protection of the environment? 
Out of the four instruments the eco-design directive is the only one which has 
compulsory effects on the products, even though the energy label directive is also 
mandatory. The eco-design directive based on article 114 TFEU is the only ‘pure’ 
internal market harmonisation measure and its environmental effects can be considered 
incidental. It is a minimum harmonisation measure and clearly part of the ‘new 
approach’, but when compared to the three other instruments it most closely resembles 
the  old  approach  of  direct  control,  whereas  the  other  instruments  the  new  way  of  
establishing voluntary incentive based instruments. The old approach was more 
effective. One possibility would be to assimilate all the different labels under the CE-
mark.164 This, or some other measure, would be a return to the old approach. It would 
surely be more effective but it would require a political retreat from the member states.  
                                                             
161 Krämer 2007, p. 259. 
162 Case C-281/01 Commission v Council [2002] ECR I-12049, para. 33-35. 
163 Ibid., para. 44. 
164 See more in Cetik 2011, p. 48. He concludes that he does not support this assimilation but that he 
would rather make all the labels mandatory.  
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The Energy Star regulation is the only instrument that has actual impact on public 
procurement. Purchasing authorities cannot purchase products that are less energy 
efficient than the requirements set by the label, although the products purchased do not 
have to bare the label. The Eco-design directive also affects the products being 
purchased, but since all products on the market have to comply with it, it really does not 
impact public procurement in any special way. The approach adopted in the Energy Star 
regulation seems plausible. It does not hinder the free movement of goods and it is not 
discriminatory. Many member states have GPP policies that define what sort of 
products authorities have to purchase. The end result of the regulation is the same, but it 
just applies as a Union wide policy. Adopting the same approach for all the labels would 
not be such a drastic measure as adopting environmentally friendly maximum 
harmonisation measures for product standards (the old approach), but it would still have 
a relevant effect on the overall consumption because public procurement accounts to 
such a large amount of the total GDP. This approach would also be in line with the 
integration  principle  of  article  11  TFEU  and  coherent  in  relation  to  the  simultaneous  
objectives of the internal market and the environment. 
The  reasons  for  this  diversity  among  the  labels  are  not  obvious  or  even  rational.  The  
labels that are mandatory are based on internal market harmonisation measures. Since 
they are mandatory they actually also have the biggest effect on the environment, while 
the environmentally targeted labels are just guidelines that do not need to be followed. 
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Instrument Legal basis Aim Content Relevance for 
GPP 
Energy 
Star 
Regulation 
192 (1) TFEU, 
environment 
Energy 
efficiency, 
internal market 
Voluntary Obliges purchasing 
authorities. 
Energy 
Label 
Directive 
194 (2) TFEU, 
internal market 
and energy 
efficiency 
Internal market, 
energy 
efficiency 
Mandatory Encourages 
purchasing of 
efficient products, 
but not mandatory. 
Ecolabel 
Regulation 
192 (1) TFEU, 
environment 
Reduced 
environmental 
impact of 
products 
Voluntary Helps in defining 
technical 
specifications 
when purchasing 
products. 
Eco-design 
Directive 
114 TFEU, 
internal market 
Internal market, 
environment 
Mandatory No specific 
relevance, but 
applies to all 
products on the 
market. 
EMAS 
Regulation 
192 (1) TFEU, 
environment 
Environmental 
performance of 
companies 
Voluntary Registration can be 
required, but 
companies can use 
other means to 
proof compliance 
with the standard. 
Table 1: summary of the differences between the studied labels. 
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4. Integrating environmental protection into public procurement 
 
This chapter focuses on assessing the extent to which the integration principle of article 
11 TFEU has been deployed in the legal context of my topic. First a short summary on 
the findings of this study is presented. It is supposed to answer my first research 
question;  what  is  the  current  legal  status  of  GPP  and  eco-labels?  Then  two  different  
approaches on why and how should the integration principle be applied regarding GPP 
are discussed. In the third part I will try to find an answer to second research question; 
how should the law be interpreted regarding GPP and eco-labels, taking into 
consideration the integration principle and coherence of the legal system? 
 
4.1 Current legislative standpoint 
 
Green public procurement is currently just a policy purported by the Union. Its 
application depends on national action or just the whim of an individual purchasing 
authority. There are a few exceptions to this, mainly the clean vehicles directive and the 
energy star regulation. Considering the principle of conferral and subsidiarity, it can be 
argued that this is the way that it should be. On the other hand, the integration principle 
of article 11 TFEU is not given any real meaning in public procurement as long as the 
Union does not issue binding requirements for the uptake of GPP.  
Currently directive 2004/18/EC on public procurement regards eco-labels as auxiliary 
tools for implementing green public procurement. This view is based on the stance 
adopted by the Commission in its Handbook designated to promote GPP and the factual 
work done by the Commission in publishing exemplary criteria for greener products.165 
Even though these are only the Commissions interpretations of the law166, and a more 
permissible interpretation of the directive would be possible167, since the ECJ has not 
addressed the issue a literal interpretation of the meaning of the directive is the soundest 
bet. This stance is further backed up by the Commission proposal for amending the 
                                                             
165 See http://ec.europa.eu/environment/gpp/eu_gpp_criteria_en.htm for the full list of criteria for 
different product groups (accessed 28.2.2012). Currently the Commission has published criteria for 19 
product groups. 
166 Buying green! –handbook  (2011), p. 2. The handbook contains a legal disclaimer.  
167 Kunzlik 2005, p. 137. 
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current directive. Since this issue is well known and the proposal does not intend to 
change it168, then it must be considered as a valid interpretation. 
In general and for most products and procurement processes, eco-labels can only be 
used to define the technical specifications desired from the products being purchased. 
The  products  cannot  be  required  to  have  the  EU  Ecolabel  or  any  other  similar  label.  
Some of the labels are mandatory but this does not affect their position as tools utilised 
by GPP. Mandatory labels and procurement practices, such as the energy label directive 
and the energy star regulation, allow using eco-labels as mandatory requirements in 
public procurement. 
 
4.2 The effects of the integration principle 
 
This  chapter  presents  two  different  approaches  to  my  topic.  Both  of  them  are  built  
around the integration principle and interpretation of secondary Union law. The first 
looks at different reasons for why the integration principle should be given effect and 
how its outcome should be assessed according to the proportionality principle. The 
second looks at what integration should mean in theory and also what are its practical 
outcomes. 
  
4.2.1 Greening EU procurement law and policy 
 
Introduction 
 
Suzanne Kingston’s book Greening EU Competition Law and Policy analyses the 
interaction between EU competition law and environmental protection. Her main line or 
argument is that efficiency is not the sole purpose of competition law and that 
environmental protection measures have to be considered in all specific policy fields of 
Union law in order for them to be effective. 
                                                             
168 See chapter 2.3.3. 
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Competition law regulates private markets whereas public procurement regulates the 
markets for public supplies. They both aim for efficiency and benefit for the consumer. 
The former aims for the benefit of the private consumer and the latter for the benefit of 
the tax payer whose money is being used to purchase the public goods. In essence, they 
are both internal market harmonisation measures aimed at the functioning of the 
common market. They both have as one of their goals to purport interstate trade.169  
Pursuing secondary policy goals with internal market harmonisation measures is the 
current reality. Both competition and public procurement law have been used to purport 
environmental goals. Because of this I consider it appropriate to analogously apply 
Kingston’s arguments to my topic. Greening EU public procurement law is very much 
on the political agenda today. Since the perennial issue in both cases is the same, 
restricting the fundamental freedoms for environmental purposes, analogous application 
of the analysis is  possible,  even without deeper comparison between the substances of 
competition and public procurement law. 
‘Greening competition law’ means introducing policy instruments that are supposed to 
have environmentally beneficial outcomes: environmental taxes, subsidies on 
environmentally friendly products, emission trading and corporate environmental 
initiatives. Greening public procurement would thus mean to pursue the purchasing of 
products with the lowest possible environmental footprint. Using eco-labels to define 
the purchased products is one example of this. 
 
Application 
 
The  book has  two main  parts.  The  first  focuses  on  should  environmental  goals  play  a  
role  in  EU  competition  law  and  policy?  The  second  analyses  the  practical  role  of  
environmental protection in EU competition law and policy. The conclusions are then 
presented in a third chapter. Alongside, the book has three aims: i) to present a 
theoretical framework for analysing the relevance of environmental factors to 
competition law and to make practical proposals based on that analysis, ii) to combine 
legal analysis with economics and political science, to better grasp the diversity of the 
                                                             
169 See Olykke 2011, on coherence between EU competition and procurement policies. 
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issue, and iii) bringing the academic and political debate on the issue together to better 
facilitate the realisation of the different aims. 
The book begins with a comparison of three different economic theories: ordoliberal, 
Harvard school and Chicago school. Their views on the role of environmental factors in 
competition law policy are analysed. Kingston concludes that the EU does not employ a 
single competition theory, but uses elements distinguishable in all three.170 A political 
decision  about  the  role  of  competition  and  the  structure  of  the  economy precedes  our  
choice for the preferred instruments on competition law. Kingston notes that the EU has 
explicitly made this decision in Article 3 (3) TEU, which states that: 
‘The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable 
development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, 
a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and 
social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of 
the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.’ 
This should serve as a starting point when trying to define what sort  of policy the EU 
should pursue in competition law.171 The  same  applies  to  public  procurement.  The  
procurement  regime  needs  to  foster  economic  activity  and  at  the  same  time  ensure  a  
high level of protection for the environment. What would be the actual legislative 
choices to pursue both of these aims? Would the general aim of facilitating GPP, or the 
specific aim of allowing an eco-label requirement, foster both of these possibly 
conflicting policies? 
 
MBIs 
The EU uses a variety of different market based instruments (MBIs) to regulate 
environmental policy and intends to increase this approach in the future.172 A shift from 
the old control based approach to the use of MBIs started in the 1980s in the neo-liberal 
wake of Reagan in the US and Thatcher in the UK.173 This is part of the same evolution 
                                                             
170 Kingston 2012, p. 38. 
171 Idib. 
172 Green Paper on market-based instruments for environment and related policy purposes, COM(2007) 
0140 final. 
173 Kingston 2012, p. 41. See Gunningham 2009, for an extensive presentation on the evolution of 
environmental law and its implications on regulation and governance. 
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that affected the way that directives are used, usually referred to as the ‘new 
approach’.174 
The use of MBIs has broadened the scope of environmental issues in competition 
law.175 Because MBIs are in essence voluntary, they can include environmental factors 
that might not be possible under obligatory legal rules since the four freedoms limit the 
possible usage of such secondary policies. The same applies to the current procurement 
regime of the Union. The only area of procurement were the purchasing authority is 
bound to follow the environmental legislation are the situations falling under the Energy 
Star regulation. In all other procurement situations, the vast majority of them, utilising 
GPP is possible but not mandatory. Eco-labels are just a tool for effective utilisation of 
GPP. 
Kingston analyses three different MBIs: state subsidies, emission trading and voluntary 
environmental initiatives. Eco-labels fall under the third group. The benefits of 
voluntary instruments are that they might complement direct regulation and contribute 
to a higher level of environmental protection. Their disadvantage is that they are 
voluntary and thus not suitable for dealing with serious environmental risks.176 As  a  
conclusion, their success depends on their content and how widely they are eventually 
deployed. A specific problem to eco-labels is the fact that there exists many overlapping 
labels within the Union. This leads to the consumer (purchasing authority) and producer 
(supplier) being confused, which ultimately hinders the potential benefits of the 
labels.177 
Member  states  have  been  keen  to  adopt  GPP but  since  it  is  a  voluntary  instrument  its  
application varies from one member state to the other.178 Many member states have their 
own local eco-labels. A locally used label can be scientifically defined and have an 
effect on what products are purchased, but it will not be effective considering inter-state 
trade. Article 11 of the Ecolabel regulation addresses this problem of divergence, but as 
long as the different labelling schemes around Europe are not harmonized the problem 
                                                             
174 Chalmers 2010, p. 696. 
175 Kingston 2012, p. 41. See also Gunningham 2009, p. 187.  
176 Kingston 2012, p. 78. 
177 Kingston 2012, p. 92. 
178 See Assessment and Comparison of National Green and Sustainable Public Procurement Criteria and 
Underlying Schemes, Final Report, ENV.G.2/SER/2009/0059r (AEA Group, 26th November 2010, 
Didcot); Green Public Procurement in Europe 2006 – Conclusions and recommendations (Virage Milieu 
& Management bv, Korte Spaarne 31, 2011 AJ Haarlem, the Netherlands); Benefits of Green Public 
Procurement (Nordic Council of Ministers, TemaNord 2009:593, Copenhagen). 
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of double standards, or even more, is not resolved. A product has to conform to many 
standards if it wishes to have the most well know labels of each of the areas that it is 
being sold at.  
Even voluntary initiatives such as MBIs can constitute entry barriers to markets.179 A 
product  that  does  not  have  a  widely  known  eco-label  will  not  be  as  alluring  to  the  
consumer as one bearing the label. This is a de facto entry barrier. The same effect can 
occur in public procurement even though no policy on favouring labelled products 
would be employed. This effect of an entry barrier is strengthened if eco-labels are 
given a strong weight in the evaluation stage of the procurement process. Requiring all 
purchased products to have a specific label would constitute a de jure entry barrier. 
Entry barriers eventually lead to centralisation of the markets which is just the opposite 
of what competition and procurement rules aim for. 
Kingston  states  that  the  ECJ  has  not  adopted  a  consistent  approach  to  environmental  
policy issues in competition law cases, but that they are resolved in an ad-hoc manner 
with standard competition analysis and minimal regard for environmental policy.180 The 
same is  not  true  for  public  procurement.  As  discussed  earlier,  the  current  state  of  law 
has been developed based on the decisions of the ECJ in cases such as Concordia and 
Wienstrom, but there still seems to be a calling for more intellectual clarity and 
coherence in the rulings of the ECJ.181 
The rest of Kingston’s book presents legal, governance and economic arguments for 
why environmental protections goals should play a role in EU competition policy. Her 
aim is to provide tools to tackle the above mentioned shortcoming in the argumentation 
of  the  ECJ.  I  will  shortly  summarise  these  arguments  and  then  apply  them  to  Union  
procurement policy. 
 
Legal systematic arguments 
Kingston’s legal systematic arguments are divided into two groups, i) environmental 
goals in relation to other policies and ii) the systemic link between the free movement 
provisions and competition law. The Treaties along with secondary instruments should 
                                                             
179 Kingston 2012, p. 93. 
180 Ibid., p. 96. 
181 See Kunzlik 2005. 
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be interpreted coherently as a whole.182 This  can  be  based  on  article  7  TFEU and the  
‘effet utile’ doctrine.183 Article 11 TFEU explicitly states this for environmental issues. 
The status of environmental law and policy has evolved from not being mentioned at all 
in the Treaty of Rome in 1957 to becoming the secondary target, after the functioning of 
the internal market, of the Union in the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009.184 Kingston interprets 
the combined meaning of article 7 and 11 TFEU and comes to the conclusion that 
environmental goals must be given priority over other policies if they do not collide. In 
situations of conflict between the environmental measures and other policies the dispute 
should be subjected to a proportionality review.185 The application of the proportionality 
principle is crucial so sustain coherence of the legal system. 
Competition law rules should be interpreted consistently with the free movement rules. 
This is because they form a whole, which Kingston calls the ‘economic constitution’.186 
Since environmental measures can be used to restrict the free movement of goods it 
should also be possible to use them to restrict competition. Furthermore, she notes that 
there is convergence in competition and environmental rules in the case law of the ECJ. 
The first part should apply to procurement law it being adjacent to competition law. The 
second is also true for procurement law cases, as discussed earlier in this thesis. 
 
Governance argument 
Good governance is essential in a system like the EU with multiple policies manifested 
in  the  TEU  and  the  TFEU.  Each  part  of  the  system  should  consider  all  the  different  
policies in its functions. The debate on EU governance centres around two issues: i) to 
bring the EU closer to its citizens and ii) to enhance the impact of EU policies.187 
According to this argumentation, if environmental protection is what the people of 
Europe want then that is what the bureaucrats should give them. Basing the policies on 
                                                             
182 Kingston 2012, p. 97. 
183 Prechal 2005, p. 216; Chalmers 2010, p. 1015. 
184 Article 3 (3) TFEU lists ’protection and improvement of the quality of the environment’ as an aim of 
the Union right after the functioning of the internal market. Also, the phrase ‘free and undistorted 
competition’ was removed from the article. Kingston thinks that this is more a symbolic change than a 
substantial one, but it must have some meaning, otherwise it would not have been made. See Kingston 
2012, p. 101. 
185 Kingston 2012, p. 117. 
186 Kingston 2012, p. 120. See also Maduro 1997 on the EU’s ‘economic constitution’ and the effects of 
article 36 TFEU. Maduro presents an interesting taxonomy on the effects of article 36 on harmonisation 
and also on the legitimacy of the economic constitution. 
187 Kingston 2012, p. 126. 
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the general opinion surely brings the EU closer to its citizens, or at least legitimizes its 
actions in their sight. Increasing the possibilities to utilise GPP would enhance the 
output of the environmental policies of the Union, if we assume that GPP is an efficient 
tool for this purpose.188 
So far only one policy paper has been issued on the importance of good governance for 
the EU.189 It highlights five principles of good governance, out of which effectiveness 
and coherence are essential when trying to combine different policies. Combining these 
different, sometimes even contradicting, policies raises questions of legal certainty. 
Does predictability suffer when secondary policies such as the environment are 
introduced into procurement practices? Kingston thinks that maximising legal certainty 
would speak against the coherence argument and would support keeping the different 
policies apart.190 In  general,  one  solution  would  be  to  make  the  environmental  
considerations a priority issue in the primary areas of law, in our case procurement. 
Especially in the case of eco-labels, making it possible to require an eco-label would not 
be unpredictable or even discriminatory since the current EU Ecolabel is based on 
scientific data and open to all interested parties to apply. Issues on legal certainty can 
also be dealt with by relying on different forms of legal argumentation. Shortly put, 
introducing value decisions into judgements actually increases substantive legal 
certainty while formal legal certainty can always be ensured by procedural rules.191  
A practical issue relating to governance is how the EU functions. The responsibility for 
the different policy areas is divided among the various sections of the Commission, the 
Directorates-Generals (DGs). Kingston notes that this creates obstacles for coherence 
and that the different DGs should co-operate for the sake of effectiveness of the 
different policies.192 One  example  of  this  is  that  GPP  issues  are  managed  by  DG  
Environment while public procurement in general is under DG Internal Market.193 
 
 
 
                                                             
188 See Lundberg 2009 on the effectiveness of GPP as a policy tool. 
189 European governance – A white paper, COM(2001) 428 final. 
190 Kingston 2012, p. 132. 
191 See Paunio 2011 on legal certainty in general and especially in the EU context. 
192 Kingston 2012, p. 139. 
193 For a list of the DGs http://ec.europa.eu/about/ds_en.htm, sourced 1.3.2012. 
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Economic argument 
The premise for the economic argument is; can article 11 TFEU be considered in 
competition economics? The possible answers to this are dependent again on the 
economic theory we assume. Without venturing into the different economic theories and 
the debate on environmental or ecologic economics, the conclusion that Kingston comes 
to is that it is possible to integrate environmental considerations into economic calculus 
of competitions decisions. In other words, environmental factors can be considered 
when making decision on EU competition policy while still retaining an economical 
approach to the issue.194 195 This  should  hold  true  for  procurement  also  since  it  deals  
with  the  efficiency  of  the  economy and  GPP is  trying  to  influence  the  producers.  The  
LCA employed by the EU GPP scheme is one form of economic calculus. 
The effectiveness of GPP from the perspective of economics has been studied.196 It was 
found that it is not as effective as an economic tool as taxes, subsidies or emission 
trading for example. GPP was seen as an effective way to implement environmental 
policies and its status value might make it politically appealing. This effect of GPP on 
the market has been acknowledged also in a practical study.197 
Concerning procurement, I draw the following conclusions from the above mentioned. 
Efficiency of environmental policy is only achieved through integration with other 
policies. Since environmental protection is mentioned as one of Union’s goals in article 
3 (3) TFEU it should be considered when interpreting other statutes. MBIs are an 
efficient way to promote environmental issues in other policy fields but being voluntary 
they are not enough. Interpreting article 7 and 11 in a coherent manner suggests giving 
precedence to environmental issues over procurement and free movement, as long as 
proportionality is respected. The ‘economic constitution’ allows for environmental 
factors  being  used  to  restrict  procurement  and  the  convergence  of  ECJ  case  law  also  
suggests this. Further relaxing the possibilities for GPP would increase the efficiency of 
the Union’s environmental policy. Introducing secondary policies to procurement is not 
a threat to legal certainty. On the contrary, it can contribute to substantial legal 
certainty, especially eco-labels might be useful for this. GPP should be moved from DG 
                                                             
194 Kingston 2012, p. 189. 
195 It has also been argued that the Coase theorem, the basic assumption of law and economics, does not 
apply to environmental law; the initial assignment of rights affects the final allocation of resources in the 
field of environmental policy. See Arcuri 2005. 
196 Lundberg 2009. 
197 Dahl 2007. 
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Environment to DG Internal market. Economic arguments can be used to analyse the 
benefits  of  GPP.  It  is  questionable  is  GPP  an  effective  tool  in  the  light  of  economics  
theories but it is effective in putting environmental goals to practice. 
In her conclusions Kingston brings out two interesting points related to integrating 
environmental protection into other policies.198 The concept of conferral seems to limit 
the possibilities for integration. According to article 5 TEU the Union can only take 
action in matters that the member states have conferred power to it. This means that 
everything that the Union does has to be based on the Treaties. Internal market actions 
such as competition or procurement and environmental issues are given a different 
stance in the Treaties. According the article 3 TFEU competition law falls under 
exclusive competence while the internal market and environment are a matter of shared 
competence according to article 4 TFEU. This limits their interplay and the way that the 
Union can drive them forward on its own. The second issue is the tension between 
economic and environmental goals. Even though the economic goal is not anymore the 
sole purpose of the Union it is still its primary aim. An example of the perceived 
importance between these two is that the TFEU contains articles that prohibit distortions 
to the economic aims but none on damaging the environment. 
Kingston  proposes  that  the  principle  of  proportionality  is  to  be  used  to  mitigate  these  
two, and all the other problems related to the integration of environmental protection 
into competition policy. She has devised a five point test for the proportionality review 
in situations of conflict.199 Translated to the context of procurement law and GPP the 
test reads: 
1. Where environmental considerations could be relevant to a case, the question 
whether they should be taken into account must be considered in coming to a 
decision. 
2. Where there is no scope at all for interpreting the procurement law provisions in 
a way that favours environmental protection, the integration principle is not 
relevant. 
3. Where it is possible to interpret procurement law provision in a way that favours 
environmental protection, and there is no conflict with the goals of procurement 
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policy, the procurement law provisions must always be interpreted in that 
manner. 
4. Where it is possible to interpret the procurement law provisions in a way that 
favours environmental protection, and there is a conflict with the goals of 
procurement policy, then the proportionality principle applies. This means that, 
where the GPP measure is suitable to achieve the environmental policy 
objectives, and there is no less restricting way of achieving these objectives, the 
measure should be allowed under procurement law. 
5. Where an economic analysis is employed, reasonably quantifiable 
environmental costs and benefits should be taken into account in assessing 
whether the efficient use of public funds is maximised by the use of GPP. 
 
The first question is a policy issue to which the EU has answered in the affirmative; it 
tries to promote the uptake of GPP and encourage member states to set up national 
action plans and targets for the utilisation of GPP. All procurement decision cause 
environmental impacts so GPP should be considered in each case. The principles of 
non-discrimination and equality fall under the second question. Since they are of the 
highest priority in the Union they cannot be compromised by environmental 
considerations. There are other rules in the procurement directive that cannot be 
interpreted loosely, mainly procedural rules.  
Especially points three and four raise questions relating to the use of GPP and eco-
labels.  Is  it  possible  in  all  situations  to  interpret  procurement  law  to  allow  the  use  of  
GPP  and  eco-labels?  How  does  the  answer  to  this  question  differ  in  relation  to  them  
being mandatory or just voluntary? Based on my prior analysis the answer is no. It is 
not possible to interpret the directive (or the proposal) in a way that would allow NPR 
PPM requirements. It does not matter are these requirements made in the form of eco-
labels  or  not.  Are  GPP  and  eco-label  requirements  ever  in  conflict  with  the  goals  of  
procurement law, especially since environmental issues have been acknowledged as a 
secondary goal in the directive? Are GPP and eco-label requirements suitable measures 
for achieving the goals of EU environmental policy? Are there any less restrictive ways 
of achieving these goals? Environmental policies can be both discriminatory and also 
run counter to the aims of a functioning internal market and the free movement of 
goods. It is not possible to explicate possible situations in this space, but on a general 
note, when (and I am sure that this will happen) contradictions between GPP and public 
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procurement arise the dispute needs to be settled with the proportionality principle. 
Whether or not the environmental protection measure deployed is the least restrictive 
one is to be analysed individually in each case.  
The  fifth  point  relates  specifically  to  the  use  of  life-cycle  analysis  as  a  part  of  the  
evaluation of the tendered products. What should be the content of the LCA and should 
it be made mandatory? The analysis should purport the internalisation of externalities so 
that the companies profiting from pollution, or the people consuming the polluting 
products, would have to pay for this. Conducting an LCA could be made a mandatory 
part of the process if the economically most advantageous tender –criteria is used to 
select the winner. Since currently only the possibilities of what can be included into 
those criteria are listed, utilising it serves as a good way for arbitrarily formulating the 
award criteria. Regulating a minimum content for it, which would include 
environmental considerations, would promote legal certainty and fight discrimination. 
 
4.2.2 Integrating environmental protection into procurement law 
 
Introduction 
 
Nele Dhondt’s book Integration of Environmental Protection into other EC Policies 
analyses the content of the integration principle of article 11 TFEU and evaluates how it 
has been put into practice in three specific policy fields. She starts off with looking at 
the historical development of article 11 and then moves on to specifying its content and 
meaning. While doing this she notices that many writers have argued that article 11 is 
just a mere principle and because of its vagueness it does not have any practical 
meaning; it is not a legal rule that can be applied.200 
From this basis she then conducts a theoretical analysis to define the nature of article 11 
as a norm. Dhondt goes through the views of Hart, Dworkin and Raz on the differences 
between principles and rules. Specifically she tries to define can principles have legal 
status as parts of a legal system, and if so, what are the criteria used to determine 
whether a principle has legal status? Since this is just a master’s thesis and there would 
                                                             
200 Dhondt 2003, p. 126. 
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be no point in summarizing an already concise summary conducted by Dhondt I will 
jump straight to her conclusions on the status of legal principles in EU-law.201 She 
comes  up  with  a  typology of  four  classes:  legal  rules,  non-legal  rules,  legal  principles  
and non-legal principles. Article 11 TFEU can be recognized as a legal principle 
because of the institutional support it has received from being codified into the TFEU 
and being applied by the ECJ.202 
What is a legal principle? A legal principle needs to be considered when making a 
decision if it is relevant for that case. It does not apply in the same all-or-nothing 
manner as rules do, but rather legal principles can be used to sort out conflicts in law. 
They may be used to argument in a certain direction but they do not point to a particular 
decision. If a conflict arises between two principles it is solved by balancing out their 
relevant importance to the case. This is not unrestricted discretion but the use of 
judgement in a particular case.203 
Dhondt tries to form a plausible interpretation of the meaning of article 11 TFEU. She 
presents three possible interpretations. The first one is the ‘weak interpretation’. 
According to it the other policy areas must consider environmental issues and this must 
have real consequences, but final discretion on how to apply environmental protection, 
or not to apply it at all, is left to the respective policy fields. The second model is the 
‘strong interpretation’ which obligates other policy fields to pursue also environmental 
goals with their own actions. The non-environmental actions must contribute to the 
environmental aims of the Union. The mode of interpretation differs according to the 
situation. If there is no conflict between the two policy fields the most environmentally 
friendly option must be chosen. In situations of conflict the least environmentally 
damaging option must be chosen. An objective that is non-compatible with the 
environmental aims can be completely abandoned. The third interpretation is the ‘very 
strong interpretation’. According to it environmental objectives are applied at all times 
in all policy fields. This means that priority is given to environmental issues. Her 
                                                             
201 As a theoretical side note, Dhondt discusses the difference between principles and policies as 
acknowledged by Dworkin; since principles give individuals rights they trump policies if they collide. 
After Dhondt concludes that article 11 TFEU is a ‘legal principle’ that has actual meaning she does not 
analyse what would happen if it and another Union policy were contradictory. This analysis would have 
been relevant since the EU has a number of policies that are contrary to environmental aims. She deals 
with this issue when she explains what she thinks is the best interpretation of the meaning of the 
integration principle, but this discussion disregards the arguments presented by Dworkin on the difference 
of principles and policies. 
202 Dhondt 2003, p 126-143. 
203 Ibid., p. 127-130. 
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conclusion is, based on the aim of the principle and ECJ case-law, that the second 
interpretation is the best one.204 
 
Application 
 
In the third part of the book Dhondt conducts a practical analysis of how the integration 
principle has affected three different policy areas: the common agricultural policy, the 
common transport  policy  and  EU energy  policy.  The  areas  studied  are  the  efforts  and  
failures of integration and instruments used for integration. The analysed instruments 
include direct regulation, market based instruments and information based 
instruments.205 She notes that the method she uses can also be used to evaluate 
integration in other policy fields.206 Next,  I  will  conduct  a  similar  review  of  how  
environmental factors have been integrated into Union procurement policy. An 
overview of the public procurement legislation has been presented in chapter 2. 
 
Are the most environmentally damaging practices encouraged? 
There does not seem to be any direct regulation that would encourage the most 
environmentally damaging products to be purchased. If the only possible award criteria 
would be the lowest price it would increase the purchasing of environmentally 
damaging products since environmental issues would be ruled out at the award stage 
(although environmental factors could still be considered when defining technical 
specifications). Local policies, which are comparable to direct regulation since 
purchasing authorities have to follow them, on the other hand can have the effect that 
the most damaging products are purchased if price is the only factor. 
The scope of this study is not enough to determine are there any economic or market-
based instruments that would encourage purchasing the most environmentally damaging 
products. Since every possible group of products can be the object of public 
procurement it is not possible to analyse whether price support, direct aid or quotas for 
example lead to purchasing authorities procuring environmentally damaging products. 
                                                             
204 Dhondt 2003, p. 108-110. 
205 Ibid., p. 190-194. 
206 Ibid., p. 485. 
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On a general level, since the ‘what to buy’ is not harmonized, and the Union 
procurement policy only applies  to procurement contracts that exceed the thresholds207, 
it is very likely that the reality in many situations is far from what is envisaged in the 
different policy papers of the Commission. 
Information based instruments are not used to promote environmentally damaging 
products. On the contrary, the fact that the Commission purports GPP, that different 
environmental labels have been put up and the integrated product policy is used by the 
Union shows that information is used to impact the purchase of environmentally 
friendly products. 
 
Are environmentally friendly and/or the least environmentally damaging practices 
encouraged? 
In  general,  the  only  pieces  of  direct  regulation  employed  in  the  field  of  GPP  are  the  
energy star regulation and the clean vehicles directive. They force central authorities to 
purchase environmentally friendly products and services. In specific, the eco-design 
directive also effects what sorts of products are procured, but since the directive affects 
all products on the market it cannot be seen as integrating environmental policy into 
public procurement. 
The above statement on market based instruments also applies to them affecting the 
purchase of the most environmentally friendly products. As already stated, the Union 
has adopted many information based measures that promote purchasing of the most 
environmentally friendly products. 
 
Integration failures 
A key aspect of integrating environmental protection into other policies in the EU is are 
external costs internalized. Externalities are costs or benefits that are not transmitted 
through prices.208 Environmentally damaging activity causes pollution which is an 
external cost. If this is not reflected to the prices of products (or the costs created at the 
                                                             
207 The threshold for public supply contracts is currently 125 000 €, see Commission regulation (EU) No 
1251/2011. 
208 Dhondt 2003, p. 194. 
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production, consumption or disposal stage) then the external costs are not internalized. 
The ones benefitting from the polluting activity do not have to pay for it.  
As discussed earlier, the EU uses market-based instruments instead of direct control in 
many of its policy fields. This is the case for GPP and eco-labels in most situations. 
Pinnacle in assessing how well the MBIs function is how well externalities are 
internalized by the current legislation. It is considered to be a market failure if this does 
not happen. The EU public procurement policy does not enhance the internalization of 
the costs of pollution. Product specific policy areas do, but since producers produce the 
same products for public and private markets this would happen anyway. Since GPP is a 
voluntary  tool  and  the  procurement  regime  in  itself  does  not  cause  externalities  to  be  
internalized I consider this to be a market failure. 
The Commission proposal for amending the procurement directive is a failure also. The 
current directive was enacted prior to the Treaty of Lisbon, which increased the impetus 
of environmental factors in the Union.209 The proposal could have taken stronger steps 
towards integration when considering the changes brought about by Lisbon and the 
newer policy papers. As discussed earlier, there would have been options that would 
have better facilitated integration in procurement policy. 
The incoherence of the eco-labelling regime hinders its functioning as a voluntary MBI. 
If labels are kept voluntary they should at least be as clear and precise to maximize their 
use and effect. 
 
Integration efforts 
The adaptation of directive 2004/18/EC, which codifies into law the Concordia and 
Wienstrom cases, is definitely a positive effort to integrate environmental issues into 
procurement policy. The Commission proposal for amending the directive continues 
this development.  The active role taken by the Commission to promote GPP has to be 
acknowledged also. The introduction of various labels that help to utilize GPP also 
supports this work. Although none of these measures are mandatory, they still have an 
effect  on  integration.  Efforts  of  dealing  with  the  market  failure  are  still  lacking  in  the  
procurement field. 
                                                             
209 On the changes made to article 3 TEU see Kingston 2012, p. 101. 
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Net balance 
It is difficult to analyse do the integration efforts outweigh the failures. A practical way 
is to look at statistics. A survey conducted in 2009 that studied procurement contracts 
concluded in seven member states showed that 45 % of the contracts included some sort 
of environmental considerations.210 In 2008 the Commission proposed that by 2010 
50% of all tendering procedures should be green (‘compliant with endorsed common 
GPP criteria’).211 It can be considered as an achievement that the factual situation is so 
close to the policy objective. But since the actual content of the contracts has not been 
studied we do not know are the environmental considerations used the best or most 
strict ones available. Considering integration, there still is much that can be done, and if 
articles 3 TEU and 11 TFEU are to be taken seriously also should be done. 
Based on the above analysis, my suggestions on improving integration of environmental 
protection into procurement law are i) to imposing obligations on both ‘how to buy’ and 
‘what to buy’ and ii) to remove the differences between the labels issued by the Union 
and harmonizing the labelling regime so that no national divergence can exists on that 
matter.  
In conclusion, article 11 TFEU should be understood as a legal principle that does have 
practical usage and that it can affect the outcome of a legal case or an administrative 
decision. The ECJ has applied it and secondary Union legislation sometimes contains a 
statement on how that piece of legislation complies with the principle and what has been 
done in this respect.212 The most suitable interpretation of the meaning of the principle 
is the ‘strong interpretation’. According to it, secondary policies must favour the most 
environmentally friendly options if they are not contrary to the primary aims, and if 
environmental protection is contrary to that aim then the least detrimental choice on the 
environment has to be chosen. In some situations applying the integration principle 
might lead to discarding the primary aim if it cannot be reconciled with the 
environmental objective. Environmental aims have to be considered in other policy 
areas but furthering environmental goals is not the main aim of those specific policies. 
The Union has taken action on several fronts to integrate environmental policy into 
procurement law but there is still a lot that can be done. 
                                                             
210 PWC 2009, p. 28. 
211 COM(2008) 400, p. 8. 
212 See recital 5 of directive 2004/18/EC on how the procurement directive is supposed to contribute to 
integration. 
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4.3 Integration and coherence 
 
Since the integration principle is written into the TFEU it must have some meaning. 
What practical effect should it have when trying to reconcile contradicting objectives? 
This question has often been assessed in legal literature but no definite answer has yet 
been given. When broadening to scope to encompass also its interrelation with the free 
movement rules the question is even more complicated.  
As long as minimum harmonisation continues to be used divergence between national 
practices will exist. This leads to problems concerning the effectiveness of Union 
measures and the democratic legitimacy of the whole integration project.213 Neither the 
treaty drafters the legislator nor the ECJ seems to have figured out an answer to the 
above mentioned, which ultimately stems from the difficulty of reconciling different 
aims and objectives.214 
Kingston’s proposition on utilising a proportionality analysis is a plausible answer for 
how to reconcile differences between treaty objectives and secondary law215, but it does 
not solve the problem of conflicting treaty objectives. Schumacher has argued that since 
the treaty objective of environmental protection has been given an enforcement tool via 
the integration principle, it would mean that it should be given priority over other 
objectives.216 Jans’  argumentation  runs  counter  to  this,  but  he  does  not  propose  a  
solution and just concludes that integration is ‘difficult and sensitive’.217 A completely 
opposing and some way pragmatic answer is given by Notaro who thinks that on the 
long term an answer cannot be found and does not need to be found, since both trade 
(free movement) and the environment are needed and one would be useless without the 
other.218  
                                                             
213 On the other hand full harmonisation also poses problems. See what problems the Commission  
recognised that full harmonisation of procurement law would have, SEC(2011) 1585, p. 33. 
214 Dougan 2000, p. 885. 
215 See also Schumacher 2000, p. 39, who presented almost identical arguments. 
216 Schumachers argument is based on ECJs ‘contextual interpretation’ of the Treaties; Schumacher 2000, 
p. 38. The Treaty of Lisbon changed the Treaty in a way that Schumacher’s argument does not seem 
convincing anymore. See Jans 2010, on the demise of the integration principle. 
217 Jans 2010, p. 8. The same applies to Arrowsmith, ‘The legal and policy questions that arise in this area 
are challenging ones that are not easily answered’; Arrowsmith 2010, p. 182. Gunningham seems to be as 
hopeless, ‘Unfortunately, the general answer to such questions is it all depends.’; Gunningham 2009, p. 
209. 
218 Notaro 2000, p. 491. 
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Coherence of the legal system is usually regarded as a something desirable.219 How well 
the integration principle of article 11 TFEU is put into practice is essential for the 
coherence of the EU legal system. Even if coherence within the legal system would not 
be reached through integration, coherence of legal argumentation can still be achieved. 
The coherence of legal argumentation cannot solve the problem of conflicting 
objectives but it can assure substantial legal certainty in decision making. Substantial 
legal certainty is more important than mere procedural legal certainty.220 The process of 
justification, either at the ECJ or by national judges, can in the end lead to coherence of 
the legal system.221 222 
  
                                                             
219 A comprehensive definition of coherence: ‘Certainly, the idea of coherence is deeply rooted in 
contemporary legal systems and is often understood as including elements such as consistency, 
comprehensiveness, and completeness as well as cross-connection and mutual justification between the 
parts of a whole. In legal theory, these aspects of coherence are often used to describe global or local 
coherence of a legal system.’, Paunio 2011, p. 94. 
220 Paunio 2011, p. 115. 
221 Kiikeri 2011, p. 261. 
222 See also Semmelmann 2010, who argues that the economic constitution does not give priority to 
economic goals over other goals of the Union. Because of this, decision in conflict situations need to be 
based on an open and balanced proportionality analysis. 
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5. Discussion 
 
The following contradictions or inconsistencies of Union law can be deduced from this 
thesis. First, article 3 (3) TEU contains the contrary aims of a well-functioning internal 
market and a high level of environmental protection. Second, pursuing environmental 
aims  with  public  procurement  is  contrary  to  the  aim  of  efficient  use  of  public  funds.  
Thirdly, inconsistency exists within the procurement framework. Directive 2004/18/EC 
only sets GPP as a desired state and grants possibilities for utilising it, while other 
secondary norms have mandatory effects on the purchasing authorities. And fourthly, 
the Union’s eco-labelling regime is inconsistent. The primary goal (and legal basis) of 
each label is either the internal market or the environment, but all of them actually 
contribute to both objectives. In addition, some of the labels are mandatory and others 
voluntary. 
The evolution of Union law and policy on procurement and the environment can be 
outlined by the following stages: 
1. How can environmental factors be taken into account in public procurement?  
· Reducing the environmental burden caused by public procurement. 
2. How can public procurement be guided by environmental factors? 
· Making public procurement as environmentally friendly as possible. 
3. How can environmental goals be pursued with public procurement? 
· Specific environmental goals targeted with specific public procurement 
practices. 
4. How can public procurement be harnessed to environmental needs? 
· Switching the purpose of public procurement from economic to 
environmental. 
Concordia started this development and took the Union to the first level. The integration 
principle of article 11 TFEU requires that Union practices reach the second level. The 
uptake and promotion of voluntary GPP by the Union is doing this. Some parts of 
current secondary legislation, notably the energy star regulation and the clean vehicles 
directive, already reach the third level. The approach adopted by the Union regarding 
product policy and goals related to carbon dioxide emissions for example can be seen as 
functioning on the third level also, even though they are not obligatory. There are no 
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implications of Union law currently established at the fourth level or even any policies 
trying to pursue it. 
The above listed problems cause incoherence in the Union’s legal system. 
Environmental goals have to be reconciled with free movement rules within the 
procurement policy. The Union should explicitly take steps to move to the third stage of 
the  outlined  evolution.  This  would  allow  taking  the  objectives  of  article  3  (3)  TEU  
seriously, while leaving the issue about the nature of the economic constitution of the 
Union untouched. The legal, economic and governance arguments presented in chapter 
4  do  not  support  a  conclusion  that  the  fourth  level  of  evolution  should  be  reached;  
changing the aim of procurement law from efficient use of public funds to protecting the 
environment.  
Taking environmental protection seriously can be achieved by measures falling under 
the third phase. These should include the following. Abolish the restriction to use NPR 
PPMs when setting technical specifications. Issuing ‘what to buy’ obligations that 
would make GPP mandatory for all purchasing authorities. Reinforcing the ‘how to 
buy’ procedural rules to make sure that no arbitrary discrimination would take place 
while the environmental criteria are applied in the procurement procedure, and also to 
increase legal certainty. Take a uniform approach to product labelling and making 
certain labels mandatory, to facilitate both the free movement of goods and the efficient 
administration of GPP in practice. 
